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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means's The Modern Corporation and Private Property1 
still speaks in an active voice. Since it first appeared in 1932, corporate law has been 
reckoning with its description of a problem of management responsibility stemming from 
a separation of ownership and control. This history has two phases. During the first 
phase, which lasted for fifty years, the book, and particularly its recommendation of 
stepped-up fiduciary constraints, became the basis of a paradigm that dominated the field. 
The second phase began in the early 1980s, when the book lost its paradigmatic position 
along with the general collapse of confidence in regulatory solutions to economic 
problems. A body of hostile criticism also had an effect.2 Some claimed that events had 
superseded the book's salience.3 Others asserted it to be wrong on the facts.4 Yet today, 
• Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. My thanks to 
Larry Mitchell, Dalia Tsuk, and participants at workshops at the Arizona, George Washington, and Rutgers­
Camden Law Schools for their comments on earlier drafts of this Essay. 
l. ADOLF A. 8ERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE !v!ODER..t'l CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(rev.ed.l99l). 
2. It was memorialized by a 26 1-page obituary published in The Journal of Law and Economics in the 
guise of a iiftieth-anniversary symposium. See Corporations and Private Properly: A Conference Sponsored by 
The Hoover /nstitwion, 26 J .L. & ECON . 235-496 ( 1 983 ). 
3. Walter Werner, Management, Stock Markets and Corporate Reforms: Eerie and }deans Reconsidered, 
77 COLUM. L REv 388 (1977). 
4. See Harold Demsetz, The Stmct11re of Ownership and the Theo1y of the Firm, 26 lL. & ECON. 375 
(1983); see also Henry G. Manne, 'flze "Higher" Criticism of the Modern C01poration, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 
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despite diminished status and generations of criticism, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property has not gone away. At the end of the second phase's second decade, 
Berle and Means retain an enviable place at the forefront of policy discussion in a field 
where even a highly successful academic contribution rarely has a shelf life exceeding 
ten years. 
The database conflnns their continued presence.5 Westlaw's "JLR" index shows 
citations of The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 677 articles as of March 
2001. Fifty-one of those articles were published in 1999, the most recent year for which 
complete data are available.6 The 1999 figure compares instructively with those of the 
two leading corporate law volumes published in the 1990s, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel's The Economic Structure of Corporate Law7 and Mark Roe's Strong Man agers, 
Weak Owners.8 Berle and Means fmnly hold their ground against the newcomers: 
Easterbrook and Fischel's book was cited in eighty-one articles in 1999; Roe's in thirty­
one. 
They do better still against their contemporaries. During the 1920s and 1930s, John 
Dewey and William 0. Douglas also joined in reconstructing corporate legal theory. 
Dewey came first with an essay, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality,9 offering a defmitive critique of a set of inherited concepts about the firm. 
Douglas and Berle followed, taking similar paths. Douglas's academic work on 
bapJcruptcy at the Columbia and Yale Law Schools led to Washington appointments and 
the rare chance to turn an academic policy construct into real world law reform. The 
j'vfodern Corporation and Private Property likewise influenced New Deallegislation.10 
Berle, moreover, 'Nas a member of the "Brain Trust" that advised Roosevelt during the 
1932 presidential campaign and an occasional advisor in Washington thereafter.11 But 
the two career paths diverged over time, with Douglas becoming a Supreme Court Justice 
and Berle remaining a professor. Yet, at least in the area ofbusiness law, Berle's voice 
remains stronger today. Douglas and Dewey tend to speak to us in the context of 
historical inquiry, whereas Berle and Means show up in discussions of present problems. 
The citation numbers again provide confirmation. Where The Modern Corporation and 
399, 399-407 (1962) (purporting to falsify central assertions as part of a thirtieth anniversary commentary); 
George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & 
ECON . 237 (1983) (describing the economics profession's reception of the book as uncritical and noting that the 
thesis was not original). 
5. Although the database does so somewhat crudely . For discussion of the inherent shortcomings of bald 
comparative citation counts such as those in the text, see Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, Determinants of 
Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews (Yale Law School Program in Studies in Law, Economics, and Public 
Policy, 'Harking Paper No. 234, 1999). 
6. The search request is "Berle w/1 0 'Modem Corporation and Private."' 
7. FFu".NK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LA\V 
(199 1 ). 
3. MARK l ROE, STRONG rvlANAGERS, V./EAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERJCAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE ( 1 99Ll,). 
9. John Dewey, The Historic Background ofCorporme Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926). 
! 0. The Modem Corporation and Private Property is credited with having laid the foundation for the 
federal securities laws. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE Ai'ID THE VISION OF Al'i AMER.ICAN 
ERA 6 1  (1987). 
11. He nonetheless rernained in residence at Columbia Law School during the New Deal. \Vhen he finally 
took a feciera1 job in 1933, it was at the State Department. !d. at 114-21. 
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Private Property shows up in 677 articles, Dewey's essay has been cited in a much 
smaller (but respectable) total of 54 articles.12 Douglas runs a distant third. His 
collaboration with Jerome Frank on the absolute priority rule shows up in only six articles 
in the Westlaw database;13 his empirical work on small bankruptcies14 is mentioned in 
eleven.15 He is better remembered for making new bankruptcy law some years later as a 
Supreme Court Justice. His opinion for Case v. Los Angeles Lumber1 6  is cited in 349 
articles 1 7  -foundational no doubt, but not as much as The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, which of course never had the benefit of the status of positive law. 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property's endurance is a singular event ii1 the 
last century of academic corporate law. This Essay seeks to explain this longevity. In so 
doing it first looks at the book in the context of its time, comparing the contemporary 
contributions of Dewey and Douglas. It goes on to reconsider the book in the context of 
contemporary corporate legal theory. Both exercises break with the tradition of 
cataloging the things the book got wrong. After the tum of the century, the interesting 
question is what Berle and Means got right. 
The answer to the question respecting the book's longevity reverses usual 
expectations concerning elements of scholarly success. We tend to look for real world 
consequences, equating success with changes in positive law. But The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property's academic survival does not result from its influence 
on New Deal legislation. Indeed, the book's prescription for remedying the problem of 
separation of ownership and control-a step up in the intensity and scope of fiduciary 
duties-must be characterized as a policy relic.18 Berle and Means survive, despite their 
prescription, because they correctly diagnosed a persistent condition. Their book's 
continued vitality results from its identification and discussion of problems left untreated 
both then and now. Leading corporate governance discussions still implicate the 
separation of ownership and control because, as Berle and Means asserted, the separation 
1 2 .  The search request is "Dewey w/8 'Corporate Legal."' Notably, only two of those citations occurred 
before 1985, the year in which Dewey's essay received renewed attention in Morton Horwitz's famous 
discussion of early twentieth century corporate legal theory. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173, 176, 224 (1985). Serle and Means, in contrast, 
show up in 1 03 pieces dated 1985 and earlier. 
13. William 0. Douglas & Jerome Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003 
( 1 933) .  
14. William Clark, William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, 77ze Business Failures Project-A Problem 
in Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 101 3  ( 1 930); William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, The Business Failures 
Project-If: An Analysis of Methods of Investigation, 40 YALE L.J. 1 034 ( 193 1 ) . 
15. The search request is "Douglas w/1 0 'Business Failure."' But only four of the eleven are in articles on 
bankruptcy; the others are in jurisprudential and historical essays. 
16. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
1 7 .  The search request is "Case w/8 'Los Angeles Lumber."' 
18. Strong fiduciary controls still have proponents, but it is now a distinctly minmity point of view. Its 
present manifestations do not necessarily retain close ties to Serle and ]\;leans. Fiduciary constraint may be 
commended for ethical reasons. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW 185, 204-09 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. , 1 995). It may be commended for efficiency reasons. 
See William W. Bratton, Game T7zeory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, 139, 144-46 (1995); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities into Gold: A 
Strategic Analysis of Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, I 08 YALE L.J. 277 ( 1 998). But no one commends it as 
the means to the end of bridging the separation of ownership and control. 
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implies shortfalls of competence and responsibility. Their association with these 
problems seems permanent and the problems themselves never seem to go away. It 
follows that we can predict a continuing presence for The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, both normative and descriptive, in the twenty-first century. 
Part I places Berle and Means in the context of the legal theory of its day by 
comparing the work of Dewey on the theory of the firm and Douglas on corporate 
reorganization. This discussion highlights two progressive assumptions B erle and Means 
shared with these business law contemporaries-a confidence in the e fficacy of judicial 
intervention to vindicate distributive policies and a distrust of the institution of contract. 
These assumptions would, in the long run, cause the book's prescription to land wide of 
the mark. After 1 980, Berle and Means lost their paradigmatic status due to a 
combination of skepticism respecting judicial competence (and a concomitant retreat to 
process scrutiny) and renewed faith in the institution of contract. Significantly, by 1 980 
the same emerging perspectives had already played a role in the Congres s ' s  abandonment 
of Douglas's corporate reorganization scheme. 
Part II reconsiders The Modern Corporation and Private Property in the context of 
contemporary corporate legal theory. It begins, in Section A, with a look at the book as 
an early example of corporate law and economics. The book's pro-regulatory posture 
reverses contemporary expectations about interdisciplinary influence, under which 
economics promotes deregulation. The alignment of methodology and policy prevailing 
in the 1930s was very different from that of today, and the book reflected that alignment. 
Section B takes up the separation of ownership and control, showing that the book's 
description of the problem synchronizes neatly with contemporary views on corporate 
governance. It turns out that even the latest microeconomic theory of the firm coexists in 
consonance with Berle and Means. Section C turns to the solution the book recommends 
for the problem of separated ownership and control, a judicially enforced norm of trust. 
Here, Berle and Means have become history, eclipsed in business law along with many 
other progressive policy positions. Yet, their book hedges its presentation carefully 
enough to retain a measure of plausibility even in a contemporary reader's eyes.  Nor 
should Berle and Means have foreseen a critical subsequent change in the context of 
corporate lawmaking. The Delaware courts have been the primary agents of the book's 
prescriptive failure. They did not assume an obstructive position until Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins19 took the federal courts out of corporate fiduciary lawmaking a few years 
after the book was published. 
This Essay's reconsideration of Berle and Means together with Dewey and Douglas 
invites characterization as an evaluation of the business law legacy of the legal realist 
movement of the 1 920s and 1930s. This invitation can only be accepted, if at all, with 
utmost caution. These writers' contributions do not constitute a core "realist legacy" in 
corporate law to which a meaningful reference may be made. Of the three,  only Douglas 
defined himself as a legal realist and self-c0nsciously pursued the realist scholarly 
program.2° Certain identifiably "realist" assumptions and metlJ.odologies do play a role in 
!9. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
20. Douglas was a member of the small group of law professors who pursued the "scientific" study of law 
Jn action. Berle joined the Columbia faculty just as those scientists were leaving Columbia for other 
�ppointmr:nts. Dewey, of course, was not a lav,; teacher at all. See 'NILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND 
THE REALIST MOVEMENT 8, 56-67 (1973). 
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the history of his bankruptcy reform. But the history supports no general pronouncements 
about realist success or failure, or realist influence or marginalization. Douglas's 
construct declined in the 1970s more because it manifested early twentieth century 
progressive thinking than because academic realism figured in its creation. Meanwhile, 
the realist status of Berle and Means has been a point of contention among legal 
historians. Some casually include them with the realists; others demur.21 The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property anticipates this confusion. Even as it shows realist 
influence, it reflects the legal formalism of the Harvard Law School that Berle attended. 
Its prescriptions, like those of Douglas, are best described as products of the progressive 
mindset. 
Even as caution prevails, respecting "realist" characterizations, one manifestly 
realist theme does emerge in this account of the survival of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. The comparison to Dewey helps isolate this theme. Dewey was not a 
lawyer and therefore cannot plausibly be called a legal realist. Yet, The Historic 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, his one corporate law intervention, 
established a realist point in the field-that what counts in the articulation of corporate 
law policy is the firm's economic and social reality, rather than the formal integrity of an 
academic theory of the firm, whether legal or economic. That point has stuck. Academic 
corporate law's continuing fidelity to it supports a claim of continued realist influence. 
Berle and Means's fidelity to it has meant a long shelf life for their book. 
II. DEWEY AND DOUGLAS : SUCCESS IN THEORY, FAILURE IN PRACTICE 
Business law was not the primary career path for either John Dewey or William 0. 
Douglas. Even so, both are remembered with Berle for contributions to the field: Dewey 
to the theory of associations, Douglas to corporate reorganization, and Berle to corporate 
governance. The business law writings of each show wh1t we take today to be the traits 
of realist scholarship, variously attacking the conceptualism of formalist legal reasoning, 
pursuing greater fact sensitivity, and encouraging (and paying) attention to social 
circumstances.22 The work of Douglas and Berle also advances the common cause of 
investor protection through regulation. But where The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property retains policy import, the work of Dewey and Douglas now resides in history 
books. 
A. John Dewey and the Theory of the Firm 
No negative inferences should be drawn from the consignment of John Dewey's The 
Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality to historical status. Dewey's essay 
is history because it made history, accomplishing everything it set out to do. It claimed no 
direct policy import, addressing only the metatheory of associations. The essay made its 
2 1 .  Under the narrower usage, Berle is not termed a realist because he was not associated with a core 
group of contemporary legal academics whose scholarship centered on empirical studies (and which included 
Douglas). See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERJCAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRJCAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 6- 1 2 
(1995). For a broader usage that easily encompasses Berle, see, for example, RONEN SHAJ\1IR, MANAGING 
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS AND THE NEW DEAL 134-37 ( 1 995). 
22. See Brian B ix, Positively Postivism, 85 VA. L. REV. 889, 894 ( 1 999) (reviewing ANTHONY A. SEBOK, 
LEGAL POSTIVISM IN AMERJCAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)). 
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metatheoretical point so clearly and irrefutably that it permanently affected the way 
lawyers think about firms. Few since have dared to reassert the theories it rejected and 
criticized.23 One strains to think of a contemporary, theoretical intervention that will 
enter the history of American jurisprudence similarly situated. 
Since Dewey was neither a lawyer nor a legal academic, he technically was not a 
"legal realist." Even so, along with other philosophical pragmatists of his day, he 
contributed to the antiformalist milieu in American social thought on which legal realism 
drew heavily.24 In this one essay, published in the Yale Law Journal, Dewey went a step 
farther, crossing the disciplinary line to make a legal contribution in the realist mode. He 
addressed a series of philosophical and legal debates (descended directly from ancient 
and medieval texts) on the question whether associations are in essence "artificial" or 
"natural." He claimed a consequentialist justification for his intervention. The whole line 
of inquiry, he contended, was causing perverse effects in legal practice. Philosophical 
ideas and dogma had found their way into law with obstructive results.25 Dewey 
administered a strong dose of realist critique. The discussants, he said, wrongheadedly 
tried to "introduce unity into a conception where the facts show utmost divergence."26 
They deployed theories that, first, yielded no determinate results-each theory "has been 
used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing ends"27-and, 
second, figured into policy debates largely as ex post rationalizations for the discussants' 
positions.28 At a descriptive level, the debate was not particularly interesting: 
corporations and other associations had an obvious social reality . 29 Tnat point being 
established, the thing to do was analyze the facts respecting given specimens of the breed, 
identifying "whatever specific consequences flow from being right-and-duty-bearing 
units."30 Dewey reminded his readers that policy problems related to corporate entities 
were a constant in Western history: 
In its various forms of ecclesiastical bodies and foundations, guilds, 
municipalities, trading companies, or business organizations, the corporation 
has always presented the same problem of how to check the tendency of group 
action to undermine the liberty of the individual or to rival the political power 
ofthe state.31 
Yet, Dewey's history did not lack contemporary implications: this historical 
observation anticipates Berle and Means's later description of conternporary practice. At 
the same time, Dewey's analysis implied a devastating critique of a theory of the flrm 
much in circulation at the time. That theory, "corporate realism" (not to be confused with 
23. The names of the naive and undereducated few are better Jdt undisclosed. 
24. For a discussion that illustrates the distinction between realism and antifonnalism, see LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 49-54 ( 1986) (reviewing antiformalism at the .Harvard Law 
School, personified in academics like Felix Frankfurter, James M. Landis, and Thomas Reed Powell). 
25. Dewey, supra note 9, at 655-57. 
26. !d. at 67 1 . 
27. !d. at 669. 
28. ld. at 663. 
29. Id. at 673. 
30. Dewey, supra note 9, at 661. 
31. !d. at 667 (quoting ERNST FRHn.;o, ST AND.-\H.DS OF M;!EfiJCi\N LEG!SLATlON 3 9 ( J 917)). 
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the realism Dewey brought to bear in criticizing it), drew on European ideas32 about the 
spiritual reality of group life to assert that the corporate entity was real and group 
dynamics were more significant in practice than individual contributions. Important 
implications followed for the large, mass-producing corporations that had suddenly 
appeared in the American economy around the tum of the century. If the essence lay in 
the group dynamic, then the entrepreneurial function could not be split and there could be 
no meaningful separation of ownership and control. The new management-dominated 
corporations ir1stead reconstituted the profit-maximizing individual of classical economic 
theorj in a collective form. Despite this, the new collectivities did not need to be 
contained by regulation. Since individuals, and not the state, supplied the creative force 
that brought corporate groups into existence, respect for individuals counseled against 
regulation of corporations despite the state's essential role in corporations' creation.33 A 
theory of group production without state control, corporate realism provided an important 
source of intellectual justification for the mass production firm. 34 
Nonetheless, corporate realism disappeared without a trace after the publication of 
Dewey's essay.35 Henceforth, with Dewey, legal theory would treat corporations as 
reifications and address itself to their economic and social consequences. The basic 
realist point had been made. In addition, the conceptual underbrush was cleared away for 
the Berle and Means account. 
B. William 0. Douglas and Corporate Reorganization 
William 0. Douglas joined the Columbia law faculty in 1926, the same year that the 
Yale Law Journal published Dewey's essay. Douglas stayed for only two years, but later 
remembered Dewey, a member of the university's philosophy department, as one of the 
friends he made during that short tem1.36 
Those two years at Columbia were among the most famously intense and troubled in 
the historj of American law faculties. Columbia's faculty was engaged in a collective 
study and discussion of curriculum reform.37 It reached broad agreement over the 
importance of a social scientific approach only to split over the recommended course of 
action.38 The "scientists"-Herman Oliphant, Underhill Moore, Hessel Yntema, Karl 
Llewellyn, Leon Marshall (an economist visiting from the University of Chicago), and 
Douglas-wanted the lC�.w school to be devoted solely to social inquiry.39 More 
conventionally minded colleagues, although ready to reform the curriculum, wanted to 
32. See Frederic i'vlaitland, Translator's introduction to OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
iviiDDLE AGE vii-xiv (Fr�deric Maitland trans., 3d ed. 1960). In the United States, the theory's most promin::nt 
advoc2.te was Emst Freund. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1884). 
33. 'Nilliam W. Bratton, The New Economic 171eory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 
STAl--l. L. REv. 1471,1490 (1989). 
34. See generaliy Horwitz, supra note 12, at 176, 224. 
35. Other critics are noted: Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. 
REV. 643 (1932); Paul Vinogradoff, Jwidico.l Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1924). 
36. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG 1-I.AN: THE EAI�LY YEA..ll.S 159 (1974) 
37. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 299-301 (1955). 
38. TWINlNG, supra note 20, at 45-55. 
39 . .ld. 
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stay in the business of training legal practitioners.40 When the school's dean resigned for 
health reasons in 1928, the faculty could not agree on a replacement.41 The university 
president, Nicholas Murray Butler, broke the deadlock by appointing one from the 
conventional faction, Young B. Smith, without consulting the faculty. Fury ensued.42 
Douglas resigned in protest. He was followed by Oliphant, Yntema, and Marshall,43 each 
of whom took new appointments at a new legal studies institute at Johns Hopkins. 
Douglas went to Yale's law school, whose dean, Robert M. Hutchins, had been hiring 
social scientists and aggressively recruited from among Columbia's disaffected.44 At 
Yale, Douglas joined Charles Clark, Thurman Arnold, and other similarly minded 
academics,45 including Underhill Moore, who after a year also moved from Columbia to 
Yale.46 
1. Douglas and the Rise of Chapter X 
Once in New Haven, Douglas worked on an empirical study of practice in individual 
and small firm bankruptcies.47 This led to consulting work on bankruptcy problems with 
the Commerce Department during the Hoover administration.48 Full-time work in 
Washington came with the New Deal. Douglas was recruited by Joseph Kennedy, the 
first chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Once again, 
bankruptcy was the topic. He conducted a study of large corporation reorganization 
procedure that laid the groundwork for an extensive revision of federal bankruptcy law.49 
Douglas turned in an eight-volume report50 and went on to become a member of the 
SEC. In that position, he co-drafted the reform legislation that became Chapter X of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (the Bankruptcy Act).51 
Chapter X effected a root-and-branch reform of the "equity receivership," a federal 
corporate reorganization practice that had reached mature form in connection with late 
40. !d. 
41 . !d. 
42. GOEBEL, supra note 37, at 304-05. The succession choice, which lay between Smi th and Oliphant, had 
been on the table for some years; Oliphant actively had courted Butler. KALMAN, supra note 24, at 68-74. 
43. DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 160-62. 
44. KALMAN, supra note 24, at I 07-1 5. 
45. DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 1 64-67. 
46. Llewellyn stayed at Columbia along with Noel Dowling, Julius Goebel, and others. TWINING, supra 
note 20, at 56. 
47. For accounts of the project, see SCHLEGEL, supra note 21, at 98-1 05; David A .  Skeel Jr., Vern 
Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) Bankmptcy Scholarship, 1 1 3  HARV. L. REv. 1075, 
1084-88 (2000). 
48. DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 1 74-75. 
49. !d. at 258-60. 
50. 1-8 SECURJT!ES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE 
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1 937-
1 940). For contemporary critic ism, see Robert T. Swaine, Democratization of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 
COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1 938). 
51. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1 938). The other drafters were Douglas 's  assistant, Abe Fortas, 
and Congressman Walter Chandler. DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 264. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of 
the SEC in Bankruptcy (University of Pennsylvania, Insti tute for Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 267, 
I 999), provides useful history about this legislation. 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century railroad bankruptcies. 5 2  Equity receivership 
entailed the creation of a new capital structure for the bankrupt firm and the distribution 
of its securities to the firm's security-holder claimants . These reorganization deals were 
cut in back rooms, in negotiations managed by Wall Street lawyers and investment 
bankers.53 Ex post judicial scrutiny was minimal. Under the fairness standard of the 
dominant line of cases, termed "relative priority," a public bondholder had no basis for 
complaint so long as the plan provided it a security with status senior to that being 
received by junior holders under the plan.54 The result was that the bankrupt firm's 
obligations could be scaled down at the expense of its debt and senior equity security­
holders, who tended to be small investors hobbled by collective action problems. 55 At the 
same time, the management group that hired the lawyers and investment bankers stayed 
in place and, despite status as a holder of junior equity, was accorded a controlling 
participation in the equity of the reorganized firm. Reorganization plans under equity 
receivership tended to leave outside investors to take back new securities of lower face 
value, diminished security, or reduced priority, even though their contracts nominally 
bestowed claimant status senior to that of the insiders who walked off with significant 
value.56 
With Chapter X, Douglas put the equity receivership out of business with a series of 
process and substantive requirements. Chapter X was designed for large reorganizing 
firms with outstanding classes of publicly held securities. It proceeded on the assumption 
that control and ownership were likely to be separate in such firms, and so Chapter X 
displaced their top managers with a judicially appointed trustee. The trustee took charge 
of the management of the business and had sole responsibility for formulating a new 
capital structure .57 The new capital structure, or "reorganization plan," had to be 
approved by a federal judge before being submitted to the firm's security holders for 
confmnation.58 Furthermore, that federal judge had to have the benefit of a report of the 
SEC on the question whether the reorganization plan adhered to substantive standards.59 
The text of Chapter X did not specifically articulate what those substantive standards 
were, requiring only that the plan be "fair and equitable." But Douglas quickly filled in 
the missing content once in his next job as a Justice of the Supreme Court. Under his 
opinion in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, Co. ,00 "fair and equitable" meant absolute, as 
52 . Douglas 's academic work on bankruptcy included a study of equity receiverships tiled in the Federal 
District Court of Connecticut. DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 1 74. See also Will iam 0. Douglas & John H. Weir, 
Equity Receiverships in the United States District Court for Connecticut: 1920-29, 4 CONN. B.J. I (1930). 
53. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. 
REV. 393, 408 . 
54. !d. at 406-08 .  
55 .  !d. at  409- 1 0. 
56. For accounts of the evolution of the equity receivership, see id. at 40 1 - 1 2; see also David A. Skeel , Jr., 
An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 5 1  V AND. L. REv. 1 325, 1 355-61 
(1998). 
57 .  7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY� 11 00.1 1 [6][d], at ]JO{}-] J 0- 1 1 (Lawrence P. King ed., 1 5th ed. rev. 
2000). 
58. 7/d. at l!0{}- 1 1 1 -12 
59. Skeel, supra note 56, at 1 371, notes that the statute accorded the SEC a less powerful  advisor; role 
than that accorded to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in railroad reorganizations. Skeel suggests 
that this may have been a concess ion to the National Bankruptcy Conference. !d. 
60. 308 U.S. I 06 ( 1 939). 
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opposed to relative, priority.6 1  Under absolute priority, no holder in a junior position can 
receive any value under a reorganization plan if any objecting holder in a senior position 
receives less than full value with respect to his claim.62 In other words, absolute priority 
wipes out insiders holding common stock if any senior bond or preferred holder receives 
less than one hundred cents on the dollar.63 
To know where to locate absolute priority's cut-off line between seniors entitled to 
receive securities in the new capital structure and juniors to be wiped out, one has to 
know how much a bankrupt firm is worth. Thus, absolute priority, which was instituted 
as a mle for judicial application, necessitates a judicial valuation of the going concern in 
reorganization. In the Chapter X scheme of things, the valuation is submitted to the judge 
by the trustee as a part of the reorganization plan.64 The mandatory SEC report then 
provides disinterested expert advice, exposing to the reviewing judge any fmagling 
designed to create room for distributions of value to junior holders who should be wiped 
out.65 
Chapter X, thus outlined, was progressive legislation that disempowered corporate 
managers and Wall Street intermediaries. It also manifested a legal realist imprint. To see 
this, it is useful to distinguish between two strands of realism: one connected to private 
law and the other to public law and economic regulation. Both strands j oin the realist 
attack on formalism, insisting on a high level of generality in statements of law ami · 
advocating narrow and pluralistic legal formulations in particular cases.66 But they differ 
on the role of the common law judge. The private law strand, most famously manifested 
in the commercial law realism of Karl Llewellyn, accorded the judge a crucial 
institutional role.67 The judge would operate at the frontier between positive law and 
business practice .  There, applying loose standards, the judge would actualize the realist 
program by confronting real-world facts and bringing them to bear in regulating business 
relationships. 
Douglas's legislation manifests no such confidence in common law adjudication.68 
Indeed, Douglas presumably deemed the federal judiciary's  performance in equity 
receiverships to be a problem for solution in Chapter x.69 Chapter X accordingly 
6 I .  Jd. at 1 22-24. 
62 . VICTOR 8RUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, B RUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN ' S  CASES AND M ATERIALS 
ON CORPORATE FINANCE 272-73 ( 1 993). 
63 . 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'i] l \ .06 at 2 1 0- 1 5  (Asa S.  Herzog & Lawrence P. King eds. ,  1 4th ed. 
1 977). 
64. 6A Jd. 'il l 0.3, at 56-68, 'l] l i .04, at 1 83-84. 
65. 6 Jd. '1! 7  .36, at 1 30 1 -05 (Asa S .  Herzog & Lawrence P. King eds., 1 4th ed. 1 978). 
66. See, e.g. , Y.  WALTER WHEELER COOK, HARVARD STUDIES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 96- 1 97 
( 1 942) (arguing for a particularistic application of the confl ict  of l aws concept of domici le) ;  Morris R. Cohen, 
On Absolutisms in Legal Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 68 1 ( 1 936). 
67 . For a discussion of the contemporary relevance of Llewellyn 's  realism in commercial law, see 
Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn 's Fading Imprint on the Jurispmdence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 1 
U. COLO. L. REV. 54 1 (2000). 
63. lt should be noted that at other times and on other bankruptcy topics, Douglas took the Jpposite tack 
and advocated reliance on the trial judge 's  powers of discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82 ;  
Skeel, supra note '-�7, at 1 085-86 (discussing Douglas's advocacy of expanded judicial discretion in the granting 
of discharges to individual debtors). 
69. ln judicial proceedings under equity receivership, courts did not have to make any finding that the firm 
was insolvent; thus, a plan that allocated value to shareholders could be deemed consistent with absolute 
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constrained the judge with a rule even as it left bankruptcy reorganization under judicial  
administration. Having taken that step, Chapter X still did not trust the judge applying the 
rule accurately to evaluate real-world business evidence. Technical advice from an 
agency expert would be required. Thus structured, Chapter X reflected legal realism's  
public law strand, which in turn reflected progressive hostility to  the rulings of courts of 
the Lochner era. Under this line o f  thinking, common law courts were both ideologically 
and administratively incapable of solving regulatory problems in the modem economy.70 
Practical reasoning and particularistic decisionrnaking still would be required, but should 
come from an expert operating in an agency framework.7 1 Judicial valuations 
encountered particularly sharp criticism because of their importance in public utility 
regulation. 72 
2. Douglas and the Fall of Chapter X 
Chapter X did succeed in displacing Wall Street lawyers and investment bankers 
from the reorganization process.73 But, even as Douglas was displaced, so his 
reorganization law package itself was later to be displaced. Chapter X did not work well 
and was replaced forty years later by Chapter 1 1  of the Bankruptcy Act of 1 978,  the 
p;esent Bankruptcy Code (the 1978 Code). The Code dispenses with trustee 
administration, leaving the bankrupt firm' s  managers in charge.74 It then returns the locus 
of deal-making authority to the back room, removing judicially enforced absolute priority 
from the center of the reorganization system. Absolute priority is demoted to second-tier 
status, contingently available for reorganizations where back room wheeling and dealing 
fails to produce agreement among the various classes of claimant. 75 Interestingly, the 
contingency has yet to occur in a Chapter 1 1  action involving a debtor with classes of 
publicly held debt. 
The impetus for the move away from Chapter X stemrned in part from 
dissatisfaction with its administrative requirements. Practitioners disliked the troika of 
trustee administration, judicial fairness review, and SEC input.76 They found they could 
avoid it in practice by filing public company reorganizations under the 1 93 8 Bankruptcy 
Act 's  Chapter XI, which had been designed for small business bankruptcies.77 A Chapter 
XI proceeding neither required a tmstee, imposed an absolute priority standard of 
fai..rness, nor looked to the SEC for input. It was, of course, manifest disregard of the 
statutory scheme to administer the reorganization of a large finn with publicly held debt 
------- ----- --
priorir;.  Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 53 , at 4 1 1 .  
70. MORTON J .  HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORJVIA TION OF AMERICAN LAW 1 870-1 960: THE CRJSJS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 22 1 ( 1 992). 
7 1 .  JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINSTRA TIVE PROCESS 23-33 ( 1 938) .  
72.  Robert Hale of Columbia was the leading exponem of this critique. See BARBARA I-I. fRJED, THE 
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT Oi\1 LAISSEZ FAIR£: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS lVlOVEMENT 
1 93-204 ( 1 99c:). 
73 .  Skeel, supra note 47 , at 1 090-93, 1 1 1 2- 1 3 .  
74. The fi rm  becomes a "debtor i n  possession ." 1 i U.S .C.  § !  1 0 1 ( 1 )  ( 1 994). 
75. Sec: l l  U.S .C.  § 1 1 29(b) ( 1 994) (stating that absolute priority B.ppli.::s only when a class of c1eclitors or 
ciaimwcs dissents). 
76. Ske<:1, supra note j I ,  at 3 1 -32 ,  44. 
77. .id. a.t 42-<:!·3 .  
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under Chapter XI. Yet, such proceedings were common by the 1 960s and 1 970s, 
facilitated by a loophole opened by Douglas himself. His opinion in General Stores Corp. 
v.  Shlensky78 made it  possible for debtors with classes of publicly held securities 
outstanding to file under Chapter XI. The case rejected the option of a per se rule on the 
choice-of-chapter question.79  Instead, it remitted the matter to determination under an 
open-ended standard, holding that the question whether a bankrupt firm with publicly 
held securities belonged under Chapter X or Chapter XI depended on "needs to be 
served."80 The idea was that some widely dispersed classes of c laimants, such as 
common stockholders8 1  and trade creditors, 82 were not included in the classes Chapter X 
was intended to protect. The courts were to take up the matter case by case.  
The Douglas of Shlensky, by then long a judge himself, no longer seemed to harbor 
the fear of judicial subterfuge or incompetence that shaped the original legislation. He 
accordingly reverted to the general realist preference for standards over rules and, joining 
realism's  private law strain, relied on the judicial capacity to discriminate in the 
administration of Chapter X. Yet Chapter X' s earlier rejection of an open-ended fairness 
standard had reflected a different policy judgment: any allowance of maneuvering room 
would come at the expense of the security-holders the statute sought to protect. Had 
Douglas held to that judgment, the Shlensky Court might have articulated a per se rule 
respecting the choice of chapter. 
As it turned out, Douglas ' s  latter day trust in judicial administration proved 
misplaced. Under Shlensky, it always made sense for an insolvent firm ' s  counsel to file 
under Chapter XI. Since the appointment of a Chapter X trustee meant that the chief 
executive officer of the client firm was fired and the worst result of a wrongful Chapter 
XI filing was removal to Chapter X, there was every reason to give XI a shot. The courts 
came to look the other way on these filings, ignoring the manifest intent of Douglas ' s  
creditor-protective statutory scheme. Perhaps Chapter X ' s  mandated rigors had become a 
medicine as distasteful to federal judges as it had been to corporate managers and the 
bankruptcy bar. Meanwhile, the edge gradually had worn off the D epression-era sense of 
the bondholder interest as a paramount "need to be served. "83 A voidance of Chapter X 
became the practice norm.84 With that, Douglas ' s  bifurcated scheme started to look 
dispensable, a look that increased its vulnerability to substantive criticism. He was 
hoisted on his own realist petard: a hard but crude choice-of-chapter rule might have 
better served Chapter X ' s  creditor protective purpose, giving it a clearer chance at 
proving its value in practice.  
Judicial gatekeeping was not the only problem, however. 85  Changes in security-
78 .  350 u.s. 462 ( 1 956). 
79. ld. at 465. Douglas ignored a narrow reading permitted by S EC v .  U.S.  Realty & lnv. Co., 3 1 0  U.S .  
·434 ( 1 940) (refusing a corporation with public debt access to  Chapter XI) .  
80. Shlensky, 350 U.S.  at 466. 
8 1 .  !d. Schlensky concerned a firm with public  common stock outstanding but no publ ic debt. 
82. SEC v.  Am. Trai ler Rentals Co., 379 U.S .  594 ( 1 965). 
83. Eric A. Posner, Tl1e Political Economy of the Bankn<plcy Reform Act of /978, 96 M ICH. L.  REV .  47, 
1 08 - 1 0  ( 1 997) (showing that the interests of managers and institutional creditors l ike banks dominated when the 
Code was drafted and enacted); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S . ,  
H . R .  REP. No. 93- 1 3 7  ( 1 973)  (reprinted in  COLLIER, supra note 57,  app. B pt. 4(c), at 4-502-05).  
84. Skeel , supra note 56, at 1 374-75. 
85. For a structural account, see id. at 1 372 .  
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holding patterns-the tendency for more small investors to hold common stock that 
created the governance problem addressed in The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property-also prompted dissatisfaction with Chapter X .  Prior to the 1 920s, the general 
public had tended to hold debt while insiders often held control blocks of stock.86 
Widespread stock ownership by the public dates from the 1 920s. During the Depression, 
both patterns of capital structure coexisted. 87 By the 1 960s, the small bondholder had 
started to disappear, as bondholding became the territory of investment institutions .88 At 
the same time, the profile of the small, public stockholder loomed ever larger. Those 
responsible for the shift away from absolute priority pointed to the shift in holding 
patterns as an investor-protective justification. 89 
The 1 978 Code also reflects institutional dissatisfaction with judicial fairness review 
in the absolute priority framework. On the one hand, absolute priority review was 
criticized for being rule-based and rigid. On the other hand, it was criticized for being 
unreliable and open-ended, dependent as it was on the vagaries of the inexact and 
manipulable exercises of valuation. 90 The financial science on which Chapter X 
depended proved as indeterminate in practice as any fractured body of Victorian formalist 
legal doctrine .9 1 The statute ' s  interpolation of an expert advisory opinion had not 
ameliorated the problem. Nor was the judiciary thought to have done a particularly 
successful job of mediating between the indeterminacy of the fmancial evidence and the 
application of the statute 's  fairness rule. The upshot was that "rules versus standards" 
ceased to be the issue by the late 1970s. Instead the necessity of judicial fairness review 
itself came to be questioned. But, unlike Depression-era observers who substituted 
agency oversight for judicial review, observers in the late- 1 970s looked toward 
contractual solutions. They had come to the view that process rules and process review 
adequately could protect dispersed investors. 92 The 1 978 Code manifested this thinking 
when it took the formation of the reorganization plan out of the hands of a fiduciary to 
return it to back room bargaining constrained by process and structure rules. These 
centered on disclosure: security-holders asked to vote in favor of reorganization plans 
were required to receive judicially endorsed disclosure documents respecting both the 
plan and fmancial condition of the fmn.93 Collective action problems would be dealt with 
through organization of similarly situated claimants into formal "classes" which would be 
represented by a new generation ofbankruptcy lawyers .94 
The bankruptcy community, in sum, had lost confidence in both agency input and 
judicial competence .  As a result, mandatory fairness review gave way to a less 
demanding system of process controls. This in turn implied an additional shift in 
presuppositions. For Douglas and his contemporaries, public senior security-holders 
86.  H . R. REP. No. 93- 1 37 ( 1 973)  (reprinted in COLLIER, sr1pra note 57,  app. 8 pt. 4(c), at 4-5 1 5- 1 6) .  
87.  Jd. 
88  Jd. 
89. H . R. REP. No. 95-595, at 22 1 -24 ( 1 977). 
90. H . R. REP. No. 93- 1 37 ( 1 973)  (reprinted in COLLIER, supra note 57,  app. 8 pt. 4( c), at 4-5 1 7-1 8). 
9 1 .  H . R. REP. No. 95-595, at 259-6 1 ( 1 977)  (memorandum of Homer Kripke). 
92 .  H . R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4 1 0- 1 8  ( 1 977) (describing standards of disclosure and judicial review under 
section 1 1 25 of the Code). 
93. 1 1  U.S.C. § 1 1 25 ( 1 994). 
94. 1 1  U.S.C. § l l  03(c) ( 1 994). 
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needed absolute priority protection because they had a collective action problem.95 Their 
inability to organize rendered them incapable of taking advantage of the institution of 
free contract so as to bargain their way to participation in a new capital structure that 
could make them better off even as it called for "give ups." The 1 978 Code readmits 
bargaining (and give ups by seniors) to an acknowledged place in the formulation of 
reorganization plans, albeit a place subject to backstop substantive controls .  
If we shift sights from the late 1 970s bankruptcy community to the late 1 970s 
corporate law community, we see a different conceptual picture. There Berle and 
Means's  paradigm, and its reliance on judicial application of fairness principles, still held 
primacy of place in legal theory, if not in courtrooms. But the theoretical shifts that 
brought down Douglas ' s  reorganization regime-skepticism respecting judicial 
competence and a concomitant retreat to process scrutiny, along with renewed faith in the 
institution of contract-were about to bring down the Berle and Means paradigm. 
III. A NEW LOOK AT BERLE AND MEANS 
Adolf Berle took up residence at Columbia Law School on a soft money basis in 
1 927 . Support came from a Rockefeller Foundation grant for a research project that 
eventually became The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle got an office 
and an adjunct teaching assignment at the Business School while he waited for a 
permanent faculty position to became available at the law school. The position appeared 
when the faculty ruptured in 1 928 :  Douglas ' s  resignation became effective on June 30, 
1 928 ;  Berle 's appointment became effective the next day.96 Soon thereafter, each edited 
a casebook on corporate fmance. The two books reflect their differing interests. Douglas 
concentrated on the rights of bondholders, whereas Berle emphasized the governance and 
control problems taken up in The Modern Corporation and Private Property.97 
'This Part ' s  reconsideration of the book proceeds in three segments. Section A 
examines Berle ' s  collaboration with Means as an early exemplar of law and economics 
inquiry. The collaboration reverses contemporary expectations. Berle went into it as a 
proponent of corporate self-regulation, only to have Means, the economist, persuade him 
of the need for government intervention. There resulted a book reflecting the theoretical 
posture of the law and economics of the day. Section B reconsiders the book' s  
presentation o f  the separation of ownership and control .  Here, w e  find the key to its 
95. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 53, at 409- 1 3 .  
96. GOEBEL, supra note 3 7 ,  at 3 1 0- 1 1 . The departure o f  the members o f  the losing faction opened up quite 
a few slots, but Berle did not "replace" Douglas as Columbia's corporate Jaw teacher. The aged George Folger 
Canfield was still teaching the corporations course, although not very successfully, unti l 1 930 .  !d. at 322. His 
much-delayed retirement blocked Berle's  appointment. Subterfuge was resorted to . In 1 927, Berle taught an 
advanced corporations course in the Business School on an adjunct basis. SCHWARZ, supra note I 0, at 5 1 . 
Canfiel d ' s  retirement had been announced a few years earlier while Douglas was an upperciass student at the 
L;:o.w School . Douglas joined some other students and held a party for the retiring Canfield after his last class, 
presenting him with a gift of pipes from Dunhi l l ' s .  Canfield was so moved that he decided to stay on, to the 
great annoyance of the dean. DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 1 47.  
97. Compare WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHAI"!KS, CASES AND iV!ATERJALS ON THE LAW OF 
fiNANCING OF BUSINESS UNITS ( 1 93 1 ), with ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., CASES AND fviATERJALS fN THE LAW OF 
CORPORATION FINANCE ( 1 930). Douglas starts with bonds on page 1 and docs not get to common stock unti l 
page 465 of his I ! 55 pages; Berle starts with the charter and the power structure and devotes 1 68 of his 903 
pages to bonds and preferred. For discussion of Douglas's pedagogy, see KALMAN, sup;·a note 24, at 85-86. 
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continuing place in corporate legal theory: the separation of ownership and control 
remains corporate law's  principal source of unsolved problems. The book's 
characterization of the problem turns out to be better aligned with today' s  views on 
corporate governance than historical memory has tended to admit. Section C turns to a 
line of analysis now thought to be wrongheaded-the book's recommendation that 
corporate governance be reconstructed around a judicially enforced norm of trust. No 
attempt is made to reverse the judgment of error. But historical memory turns out to be 
inaccurate once again. Berle and Means made their policy recommendations with 
scrupulous recognition of problems and weak points, anticipating contemporary 
obj ections. Even here, at its point of failure, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property retains a pragmatic modesty that imports plausibility. 
A. Law and Economics Before Law and Economics 
Berle ' s  Rockefeller grant stipulated an "interdisciplinary" study of corporations to 
be conducted with an economist. Berle chose Gardiner Means, a friend from his youth 
who had become an economics graduate student, first at Columbia and later at Harvard.98 
Means first joined the proj ect as a "statistical and economics research assistant"99 and 
contributed the book's  empirical studies of corporate concentration and dispersed share 
ownership. Berle eventually conceded co-authorship and one-third of the royalties. 1 00 
When work began in 1 927, Berle was already well known for a series of law review 
commentaries on corporate law. 1 0 1 Management power and the shareholders ' inability to 
control it appear as central concerns even in this early work. 1 02 But the Berle of the 
1 920s remained highly skeptical respecting prospects for constructive judicial 
intervention: "[C]ourts cannot be expected to work out rules of conduct for the business 
community except with the guidance and assistance of business men themselves, and for 
this purpose business standards must be made apparent."1 03 For Berle, the problem was 
that the sources of corporate regulation-charters and statutes-were not helping to make 
"business standards" apparent. Then, as now, the practice standard favored broad drafting 
toward the end of giving management complete discretion. Berle saw a resulting need for 
constraints on management discretion. But he looked to self-regulation instead of 
judicially administered fiduciary principles. 1 04 More specifically, he suggested that: ( 1 )  
investment bankers organize themselves into an enforcement body to facilitate scrutiny 
(and screening) of firms making public securities offerings; (2) stock exchanges withhold 
listing from firms whose managers abused their power and demand disclosure of 
corporate information; and (3) large ir1stitutional shareholders li.\:e insurance companies 
98. SCHWARZ, supra note 1 0, at 5 1 .  
99. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.,  NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1 9 1 8- 1 97 1 ,  at 2 1 (Beatrice Bishop Ber!e & Travis 
Beal Jacobs eds . ,  1 973)  
I 00 .  SCHWARZ, supra note 1 0, a t  58-59. 
I 0 I .  He summarized this work in a 1 928  book, ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE ( 1 928). 
1 02. !d. at 26-34 , 37 . 
I 03. !d. at 36. 
I 04. For a ccntemporary aiticubtion of this position wel l -rooted in the economic theo!"'J of the firm, see 
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing 
Corporation, _ U. PA. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 200 1 ) . 
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might be positioned to obtain accurate information about issuers and to protect 
shareholder rights . 1 05 With respect to institutional holders he had a more specific 
suggestion: 
Suppose . . . trust companies were in the habit of accepting, on "custodian 
account," deposits of stocks from small shareholders, thereby gathering many 
small holdings into an institution commanding a block so large that protection 
was worth while, and that they also provided themselves with power to 
represent the depositors of stock. Such institutions could easily keep 
themselves informed as to the affairs of the corporation . . .  and, as representing 
their clients, could take the action necessary to prevent or rectify violations of 
. h 1 06 property ng ts . . . .  
Ironically, each of the items on Berle's list shows up prominently in contemporary 
governance debates. ! 07 
Berle ' s attitude toward regulation changed even before the stock market crashed. 1 08 
The catalyst was Means, whose empirical studies showed that one-third of the national 
wealth lay in the hands of two hundred large corporations. Means proj ected that given the 
continuation of the present rate of growth of that relative share, seventy percent of 
economic activity would be carried on by two hundred corporations by 1 950 even as 
share ownership became more and more dispersed. 1 09 The upshot was that economic 
power was becoming concentrated in the hands of a cluster of corporate managers, the 
same group whose level of responsibility had already come to concern Berle. What Berle 
formerly had seen as a problem of finance, he now came to see as a problem of 
governance. 1 1 0  The corporate system, as he would write in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, had attracted to itself certain significant attributes and powers, and now 
amounted to a major social institution. 1 1 1  Individual property had gone into a "collective 
hopper" which had brought forth huge industrial oligarchies . 1 1 2  The oligarchs exercised 
unified control over the wealth under their charge, and the law had played a role in 
investing this power. 1 1 3 This called for governmental intervention. With the crash and 
subsequent economic depression, Berle later recalled, many others who had been hostile 
to regulation in the 1 920s became receptive to this criticism of the corporate governance 
regime. 1 1 4 
Corporate law thus met economics law seventy years ago with results different from 
those usually attending such encounters today. In the Berle-Means collaboration, the 
economics prompted the lawyer to abandon a self-regulatory approach in favor of 
I 05.  BERLE, supra note I 0 1 , at 37-39.  
I 06.  !d. at 39.  
I 07. See, e.g. ,  Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, I 09 HARV. 
L. REv. 1 9 1 1 ( 1 996); Paul G. M ahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1 453 ( 1 997); Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, I 07 YALE L.J.  2359 ( 1 998).  
1 08 .  The change occurred by the spring of 1 929. SCHWARZ, supra note I 0, at 55. 
1 09 .  BERLE & M EANS, supra note I ,  at 9, 37 ,  47. 
1 1 0. !d. at 56 .  
I l l . Id at 3. 
1 1 2. /d. at v.  
1 1 3 .  !d. at 4, 1 3 1 .  
1 1 4 . BERLE, supra note 99, at 22.  
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government control of corporate activity. Today economics tends to encourage lawyers to 
take deregulatory positions. The shift in the pattern of influence doubtless reflects shifts 
in political currents. But other, more narrowly academic factors also operate. Means's 
institutional economics, which might today be characterized as socio-economics, fit much 
more neatly into the law and society project of the legal realists of the 1 9 20s than it 
would fit into the microeconomic project of contemporary corporate legal theory. The 
institutional economists of Means's  era disliked the deductive methodology of classical 
economics and sought a more capacious framework for describing economic behavior. 
They worked together with the legal realists in describing the economy's legal 
underpinnings and shared their reformist leanings.115 
An interventionist profile also made sense given the prevailing posture of the theory 
of the firm. Economics had no theory of the firm on which Berle and Means could draw 
in discussing the problem of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. The 
microeconomics of corporate governance dates only from the 1 970s.116 In Berle and 
Means's day, microeconomics was thought to be a theory about markets. It modeled only 
the price system's coordination and use of resources and distribution of income.1 1 7 The 
firm was accorded "black box" status.118 That perception accorded exactly with that of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property: results within firms were seen as 
engineered in a hierarchical context and therefore unsuited to description under a 
paradigm designed for the study of markets. l l 9 Microeconomics accordingly dealt with 
the firm at the level of assumption: it was deemed a production function that followed 
profit considerations and behaved as an entity in rational patterns no different from those 
of human actors.120 The Modern Corporation and Private Property became famous 
because it successfully challenged that assumption's plausibility.121 
B. The Enduring Separation of Ownership and Control 
Dewey 's The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality opened a gap 
when it signaled that corporate legal theory would have to be re-thought for the new 
1 1 5. See FRJED, supra note 72, at 11-12 (describing the effect realists had on the economics of that era). 
116. Ronald Coase made the earliest suggestion in the field that internal firm operations could be described 
contractually. See R.H.  Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 ( 1937). But his model had no 
influence until after 1 970. R.H .  Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 23 ( 1 988). 
1 1 7 .  Will iam W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts " Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. 
REv. 407, 4 1 5  ( 1 98 9 ). 
1 1 8 .  That i s, a production function that behaved as a rational, pure profit-maximizing entity. !d. at 4 1 5- 1 6 . 
1 1 9. See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J . L. ECON. & ORG. 1 41, 142 ( 1 988) 
(offering a brief description of firms and the price system prior to the perfect competition model);  Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior. Agency Costs and Ownership 
Stn1cture, 3 J. FIN . ECON. 305, 306-07 (1976) (citing discontent among economists over the inabi l i ty to find a 
suitable model to explain the firm). 
120. See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contracwal Nature oftlre Firm, 26 J .L .  & ECON. I (1983) (discussing 
R .H .  Coase ' s  The Nature of the Firm from a piece-rate contract standpoint); Harold Demsetz, The Stmcture of 
Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375 ,  377-78 (1983) (exploring the economic theory of 
the firm). 
1 21. In so doing, it perfom1ed a core institutional function. Thorsten Veblen had attacked neoclassical 
methodology in which capital ist institutions were "taken for granted, denied, or explained away ." THORSTEN 
VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODE�'J CIVILIZATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 233 ( 1919). 
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context of the twentieth century. The Modern Corporation and Private Property filled the 
gap with the separation of ownership and control, which has remained at the forefront of 
policy analysis of corporate governance ever since. The book ' s  claim of concomitant 
economic and social dislocation also remains on the table, and has never been 
successfully refuted by generations of apologists for corporate institutions. Thus situated, 
the book ' s  ideas continue to move discussions. 
Bringing corporate legal theory into the twentieth century meant the severance of 
some ties to classical economics, with which nineteenth century corporate law had shared 
certain basic assumptions. Under that earlier, shared vision, the usual case of production 
and trade was conducted by self-employed individuals. Corporate production was an 
exception limited to special situations. Limitations on corporate authority were thought 
inevitably to accompany that special status, and corporate law was thought of as the 
appropriate means of limitation. 1 22 But as corporate law evolved during the nineteenth 
century, it stopped placing limits on corporate operations. It instead facilitated the 
appearance and success of the large, mass-producing, management-controlled 
corporation. This was a reactive rather than a purposive development. As Berle and 
Means noted, the change recognized underlying economic facts . 1 23 But, for them, the 
transition from the classical economy had caused the law to become implicated in the 
creation and perpetuation of an unsatisfactory situation. 
In the classical model, profit-maximizing individual entrepreneurs both o¥m the 
means of production and make all decisions respecting production and consumption. 1 24 
Power relations are bilateral: one actor can affect another's  behavior only indirectly, by 
refusing to contract. The result is market competition that effectively controls the 
producers, constrains both the i..Dcompetent and the greedy, and legitiinatizes private 
economic power. 1 25 But corporate mass production on a large capital base does not fit 
within the classical model's  legitimating parameters . As Berle and Means pointed out, the 
big corporations of the twentieth century had split the classical entrepreneurial function 
between salaried executives, who sit atop hierarchical organizations, and anonymous 
equity participants, who hold small stakes and prize market liquidity over participation. 1 26 
Berle and Means showed that this combination of capitalization through liquid securities 
markets and management by salaried professionals fit awkwardly in the wider socio­
economic scheme. It presented problems of competence and responsibility absent in an 
ideal capitalist world inhabited by self-employed individual producers . 1 27 The fit remai.ns 
awkward to this day. 
Some of the rhetoric with which Berle and Mear.s describe the situation sounds 
outdated, 1 28 and ]\;leans ' s  prediction of ever-increasing concentration and dispersion of 
ownership did not prove accurate. But Berle and Means hit the issue. The split in the 
classical entrepreneurial function came to be seen as a problem by observers on all points 
of 0:ventieth century America' s  ideological spectrum, even as few denied the large 
1 22 .  Bratton, supra note 3 3 ,  at 1 483-84. 
1 23 .  BERLE & IvlEANS, supra note ! , at 1 3 ! .  
1 24.  Bratton, supra note 33 ,  at 1 486.  
1 25.  BERLE & !\!lEANS, wpra note l ,  at 9 .  
! 26 .  !d. at 9,  73-85,  308.  
1 27 .  /d. at l 3 l .  
1 2 8. See. e.g. , id. at 4 (refen-in,\j to "prir.ces of industry"). 
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corporation's  success as  a producer. 1 29 The problem has never been solved. Instead, we 
have a process of accommodation and adjustment between the mass-producir1g, 
management-controlled corporation and the wider economy and society. The process, 
which began before the tum of the twentieth century, continues into the twenty-first. 
Berle and Means play an enduring and exceptional role ill. the acco1Th110dation 
process. To get a sense of this uniqueness, compare the history of their theory 's  
paradigmatic replacement-the contractarian theory of the firm that b ecame ascendant in 
the 1 980s. The contractarians scored many points, but they failed to displace the 
separation of ownership and control with a free market success story. 1 30 
Contractarianism drew on a line of contemporary microeconomic theory that 
succeeded where classical microeconomics stopped short, modeling the governance of 
large firms with separate ownership and control as incidents of contracting among the 
rational economic actors . Under the model, there is no meaningful separation of 
ownership and control. Since the finn represents a series of contracts joining inputs to 
outputs, ownership becomes an irrelevant concept. 1 3 1 Equity capital, the focus of the 
Berle and Means analysis, is simply one of the inputs, and corporate law a part of lh.at 
input' s  governing contract. 1 32 Nor do the terms of the equity contract present problems 
calling for regulatory solution. The imperfections subsumed tmder Berle and :Means 's  
"separation" rubric reemerge under the more neutral denomination "agency costs ."  
In the model ' s  pure version, free market competition solves the problem of the 
separation of ownership and control by forcing firms to mini.mize agency costs . Managers 
are not the powerful actors described by Berle and Means . When they fail, they are 
removed-either a hostile offeror takes over the company and throws them out, the firm 
with a high agency cost base fails to survive in the product market, or the managers fail to 
survive in the management labor market in the first place.  Their il1centives are 
accordingly focused on long-run productive success for the firrn. 1 33 The regulatoc-y 
agenda becomes blank and cost-reductive deregulation is counseled. 
This contractarian attempt to consign Berle and Means to the scrapheap fai1ed in 
short order, however. It depended on the plausibility of the assertion that fre.::-nEr·ket 
forces by themselves minimize agency costs. The corporate la;,v community gave that 
assertion due consideration and emerged unpersuaded. 1 34 The asse1ied labor and produce 
market conectives turned out on inspection to be more theoretical than real. "fhe t8.keovc::;· 
corrective started out the 1 980s with vigor, i1nporting plausibility to the model, 1 3 5 but ran 
into some unanticipated public choice problems. TI1e rnodel emerged in ,�he 1 9S'i.Js 
severely compromised. Discussion still proceeded under the :mbric of con"trz.ct, but it was 
not at all clear that optimal management-shareholder contracts and goverT.i.3.l•Gc 
1 29.  The collective aspect o f  corporatization that Berle identified implied that standard individuaiist 
defenses against government intel\'ention did not apply to large corporations.  See id. at Ji. 
! 30. vVi l l iam W. B ratton, The Economic Stmcture of the Post-Contraciual Co1pomtion, 87 Nw. U .L. ? .. EV . 
1 80, 193-97 ( 1 992). 
1 3 1 .  Bratton, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at •l20. 
1 32 .  B ERLE & MEANS,  supra note 1,  at L�20. 
1 33 .  Bratton, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at 41 7-!  3. 
1 3L\. See, e.g. , the essays collected in Symposium Contrac<u2.l Frc:edom in Cor;Jo>ate Law, ;c; CCd.n ; _  1:... . 
REV. 1 395- 1 77 4  ( 1 989).  
1 3 5. See Bratton , supra note 33, at 1 5 1 7- ! 9 . 
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arrangements were attainable within the large corporation's  institutional framework. 
Collective action problems substantially impaired contractual self-protection by the 
dispersed equity interest. Agency costs remained suboptimally high. 1 36 In other words, 
the corporation's  agency cost posture remained suboptimal because of the separation of 
ownership from control .  Berle and Means thus returned to the top of corporate law's  
policy agenda in  the 1 990s. 1 37 
But they returned to a framework of discussion that had changed radically under 
contractarian influence. Where Berle and Means suggested amelioration through 
regulation, contemporary corporate law writers return to the self-regulatory strategies that 
Berle considered and abandoned in the 1 920s. 1 3 8 That return follows from a number of 
influences. Politics is one-confidence in regulatory solutions to economic problems 
remains low. Academic methodology is another-contractarianism's microeconornic 
assumptions have persisted even though its assertion of thorough-going market success 
proved unpersuasive. Changes of corporate circumstances come third, and possibly first, 
in causal importance. By 1 990, the proportion of equities held by institutional investors 
had increased so much as to make it plausible to project that the shareholder collective 
action pr"blem at the core of the separation of ownership and control might be overcome 
in practice. 1 39 This has not happened in a formal, institutional sense-institutional 
shareholders have not organized themselves into oversight committees or invested in 
election campaigns to gain places on boards of directors. But profound changes have 
occurred at a normative leve1. 1 40 Shareholder value now sits atop management agendas. 
Managers who create value build reputations and careers. Managers who do not are 
deemed failures.  Managerialism, the contra-norm against which Berle and Means wrote 
and which guided corporate behavior through the 1980s, has not disappeared. But it no 
longer is respectable if untempered by reference to the shareholder interest. Outcomes 
change in the shareholders ' favor as a result. Self-regulatory strategies become more 
plausible. When considered in comparison to the costs and perverse effects of regulation, 
they even start to look attractive.  
Meanwhile, the microeconomics of the firm has been restated in a second best 
framework. The restatement realigns it with Berle and Means. Under the now-prevailing, 
incomplete contracts approach, 1 4 1  transacting actors are deemed able to create producing 
1 36 .  John C.  Coffee, Jr., The Mandat01y!Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay in the Judicial 
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1 6 1 8, 1 674 n.234,  1 675-76 ( I  989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV .  1 549, 1 577 ( I  989). 
13 7 .  A further substantive comparison of the two leading corporate l aw volumes published in the 1 990s­
Easterbrook and Fischel ' s  The Economic Struc!llre of Corporate Law, and Roe ' s  Strong Afanagers, Weak 
Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance---confirms thi s  assertion . Easterbrook and 
Fischel ' s  book summarizes a series of articles written in the 1 980s, and for the most part avoids any mention o f  
Berle and Means. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7,  a t  8 1 -82,  1 27 & n . 9 ,  2 9 5  & n . 1 4 .  With Roe, the 
problem of the separation of ownership and control and the "Berle and Means corporation" are principal subject 
matter. ROE, supra note 8 ,  at 6- 1 7 .  
1 38 . See supra notes I 0 1 -07 and accompanying text. 
1 39. See. e.g. , Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 fvliCH. L. REV. 520 ( 1 990) 
(con tending that institutional concentration implicates curative cost effi ciencies).  
1 40 .  Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 25 3 ,  1 27 8-87 ( 1 999). 
1 4 1 .  For overviews of the l i terature, see B ERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONO:Vl!CS OF CONTRACTS:  A PRIMER 
1 7  5 - 1 8 8  ( 1 997); Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 
73, 75-79 ( 1 998) . For precedent treatments i n  the legal l i terature, see, for example, Phi l l ippe Aghion & 
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institutions that assuredly evolve to first-best status only to the extent that they deal with 
"contractible" subject matter. Contractibility is not a safe assumption, 1 42 particularly with 
respect to corporate governance .  The contracts that create and govern corporate capital 
structures are seen as archetypical examples of second-best solutions to noncontractible 
governance problems. They are empty at the core, omitting important future variables 
because of the difficulty or impossibility of ex ante description or ex post observation and 
verification. Shareholders, for example, contribute capital in the absence of terms 
governing such fundamental matters as investment policy, dividend payout rate, and 
management remuneration and tenure. 
Power, expunged from the economic description of the firm by contractarianism, 
returns to the center of the picture under this theory. To the extent that advance 
contractual specification is not feasible, power allocations play a larger governance role 
and bear importantly on the firm's productivity. 1 43 More particularly, the contracts 
governing the rights of the firm's security-holders deal with critical noncontractible, 
future contingencies by providing open-ended processes that facilitate control's 
allocation and reallocation. 1 44 Reallocations follow from the exercise of contingent 
powers to control the firm's assets, 1 45 powers in some cases vested by the basic terms of 
corporate law and in other cases vested by contract. The control transfer mechanisms are 
particularly important when the firm performs badly. They determine whether the 
shareholders vote out the managers, whether a blockholder emerges to put the managers 
under effective control, whether a tender offer occurs so as to effect needed change, and 
whether the bondholders take control of the assets in distress situations. 1 46 The theory 
proceeds on the assumption that some power allocation mechanisms work better than 
others and tries to identify the properties of the better arrangements. Toward this end, it 
models the impact of particular provisions for control transfer on ex ante incentives to 
make firm-specific investments of human and financial capital. 
Benjamin Hem1alin,  Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J . L. ECON. & ORG. 3 8 1 
( 1 990); Wil l iam W. Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, 1 9  CARDOZO L. REv. 409 
( 1 997) ;  Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Dury, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299 ( 1 993); Avery Katz, 
When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 1 05 YALE 
L.J .  1 249, 1 278-79 ( 1 996). 
1 42 .  To have contract terms that govern future states, those contingent states must be specified and the 
future outcomes must be computable .  S ince many future states of nature are clearly not compu table, transacting 
parties as a result l ack the technology necessary to enable the negotiation and composition of a contract term ex 
ante. See Luca Anderl ini  & Leonardo Fel l i ,  Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature, 1 09 
Q.J .  ECON. 1 085 ( 1 994). Alternatively, even where an ex ante contract term can be devised in themy, ex ante 
agreement on that contract term wil l  not be feasible if in practice a party':;  future performance of the term will 
be either unobservable by the counterparty or unveri fiable by the enforcing authority. For contribution:; to the 
l i terature making this point, see general ly Sanford J. Grossman & O l iver D. Hart, The Costs and Beneji1s of 
Ownership: A The01y of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J .  POL. ECON. 691  ( 1 986); Bengt Holms trom & 
Paul M i l gram, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts. Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 
J . L  ECON. & ORG. 24 ( 1 99 1  ) .  
1 43 .  Raughuram U. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theo;y of the Firm. 1 1 3 Q . J .  ECON . 337 ( 1 998). 
1 44. See Phil ippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Comracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 
59 REV. ECON . STUD. 473, 479 ( 1 992). 
1 45. Jd. at 484. 
1 46. There is disagreement within the incompiet.� contracts l i terature respecting the effi c i ent location of 
control rights, in particular with respect to the debt/equity trade off. See Raj an & Zingales,  supra note 1 �·3 ,  ai 
404-06. 
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Notably, the "owner" of a particular asset is defmed in this context as the party who 
has the right to control all aspects of the asset to the extent not specified in a contract ex 
ante. Ownership is control under this defmition and the two cannot b e  separated. On the 
surface this looks like a fundamental repudiation of Berle and Means . But the appearance 
deceives . The concept admits the possibility that ownership can be shared among 
different claimants. 1 47 Exercises in the theory that articulate the characteristics of 
"shared" ownership show that the new model accommodates the management-controlled 
firm of the Berle and Means characterization. Managers are seen to share control with the 
equity, retaining "effective" control in most states subj ect to displacement by the 
shareholders in exceptional situations. 1 48 As thus extended, incomplete contracts theory 
comes to bear on production-specific aspects of firm governance-a manufacturer ' s  
decision t o  make or buy a component part1 49-in addition t o  control transfer events like 
takeovers, proxy contests, and insolvency receiverships. The subject matter for 
examination in these extensions is not "ownership" of assets per se but the grant of access 
to assets owned by others. Here again, the emphasis is on the identification o f  governance 
arrangements that encourage frrm-specific investment and thereby enhance value. 1 50 To 
the extent that inherited institutions of control-sharing between managers and shareholder 
permit managers to invest suboptimally, what Berle and Means called the "separation" of 
ownership and control remains a significant problem in economic theory. 1 5 1 
The perspective of incomplete contracts theory, thus contextualized, overlaps that o f  
The Modern Corporation and Private Property. As noted above, incomplete contracts 
theory focuses on incentive compatibility, distinguishing features of firm governance 
structures that encourage optimal output from those that do not . 1 52 Viewed through the 
lens o f  this theory, Berle and Means appear as the original expositors of corporate law' s  
leading incentive compatibility problem. A perfect incentive system, said Berle and 
Means, would replicate the motivations of the sole proprietor of classical econornics. 1 53 
The incentives of actual corporate managers were considerably lower powered. This 
second-best governance structure could persist despite market pressures so long as 
managers performed well enough to provide investors a satisfactory rate of retum. 1 54 
They argued that a different scenario would be hard to sustain: if all profits were devoted 
to the enhancement of shareholder value, managers would have no incentive to do a more 
efficient job. 1 55 At a minimum, then, the incentive question concerned the composition of 
1 47.  Grossman & Hart, supra note 1 42,  at 695. 
1 48 .  Mike Burkhart et al . ,  Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm , 1 1 2 Q.J .  ECON. 693, 
696,  7 1 2  ( 1 997). 
1 49.  Rajan & Zinga1es, supra note 1 43 , at 4 1 9-20. 
1 50. !d. at 387-90. 
1 5 1 . OLIVER HART, FIRiv!S, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE ( 1 995) offers a formal expression of 
this point. The insight is that given managers who derive no private benefits from control of assets, first-best 
results easily can be achieved (in a taxless world) with an all equity capital structure and a simple incentive 
compensation system. In a second-best world, however, the compensation required to al ign man2gement 
incentives with those of the outside security holders is unfeasibly large. 
1 52. See supra notes 1 43 -46 and accompanying text. 
1 53 .  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 ,  at 9, 308. 
1 54. !d. at 62-65. 
1 55 .  ld at 30 1 -02, 3 06-07. 
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the management compensation pay package. 1 56 Pending some contractual solution to the 
incentive problem, there remained an envelope within which managers seeking enhanced 
power had an incentive to reinvest earnings in proj ects which are suboptimal from the 
shareholder point of view. 1 57 Other sorts of management empire-building also could 
detract from shareholder value. For instance,  investments in labor standards higher than 
those prevailing among competing firms also came out of the shareholders ' pockets even 
though motivated by concern for employee welfare . 1 58 
With this analysis, Berle and Means anticipated the leading policy concerns of 
contemporary corporate legal theory. First, as they suggested, high salaries alone do not 
provide optimal motivation in the absence of stock ownership. Today' s  discussion turns 
to stock option compensation as an amelioration. But an optimal incentive package has 
yet to appear. Secondly, as they suggested, empire-building is highly likely to show up in 
the system. This is now thought to be less of a problem than before, but it took the 1 980s 
bust-up takeover and the 1 990s practice of voluntary corporate unbundling to work 
generations of imperial accretions out of American corporate structures .  Thirdly, as they 
suggested, management and internally influential, non-shareholder constituents often 
have common interests contrary to those of the shareholders. The implications of this 
conflict are worked through in contemporary debates over constituency rights . 1 59 Finally, 
it is noted that Berle and Means did not model the separation of ownership and control as 
a monolithic phenomenon. They described it as a matter of degree, with the nature and 
extent of the incentive problem varying from firm to firm. Their five-part typology of 
control anangements 1 60 tracks current cutting-edge work in financial economics. 1 6 1 
C. The Separation of Ownership and Control, and Fiduciary Duty 
The foregoing discussion shows that Berle and Means endure in corporate law 
because they accurately described an enduring problem. At a prescriptive level, in 
contrast, they are now regarded as the authors of a past paradigm. Their recommendation 
of equitable judicial intervention makes them famous names who got it wrong, well on 
Lhe way to joining Douglas and the other legal realists in the back room of history. 
This Section reconsiders the book's  prescriptive assertions. It makes no attempt to 
disturb the conventional view that their recommendations landed wide of the mark. But it 
argues that the distance from the target is shorter than remembered. For one thing, the 
book makes its suggestions with a modesty in marked contrast to the aggressive advocacy 
prevalent in scholarship today. 1 62 More importantly, the miss follows less from the 
book's  analysis of corporate problems than from now discarded progressive assumptions 
about regulation: Berle and Means lost paradigmatic status for roughly the same reasons 
1 56. !d. at 302. 
1 57. ld. at l l 5 - 1 6. 
1 58 .  BERLE 8 dvlEANS, supra note 1 ,  at 1 5- 1 6 . 
1 59.  The best exposition of the constituency rights position is David Mil lon, Communitarianism in 
Corporate Law: Foundaiions and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1 8 ,  I 
( 1 995). 
l .SO. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 ,  at 66- 1 1 1 . 
i 6 ! .  See the typology in Rafael La Porta et al . ,  Corporate Ownership A round the World, 54 J. FIN. 47 1 ,  
t06-80 ( 1 999). 
1 62 .  Discretion counsels against a stmement of particular examples. 
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that led Congress to dispense with Chapter X. Finally, the book's failure accurately to 
predict the future course of corporate fiduciary law stems in part from a development 
Berle could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate-the rise of the Delaware 
courts as the dominant force in the making of corporate case law due to the ancillary 
disappearance of federal common law after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 1 63 
Berle and Means grounded their prescriptive analysis in a normative inference 
drawn from the separation of ownership and control. Corporate property, they asserted, 
should no longer be deemed private property . 1 64 That assertion in tum supported a 
presumption favoring regulation of corporate governance .  Yet, the book recommended no 
pervasive system of government oversight. Instead it focused on the problem of 
management self-dealing, reasoning as follows: management, in the absence of a 
controlling owner, has de facto power to confiscate part of the corporation's wealth 1 65 
and corporate law is not able to constrain this power of confiscation. Berle and Means 
argued that corporate law would do a better job if it were rewritten to follow basic 
principles of trust law. More particularly, there should be a pervasive equitable limitation 
on powers granted to corporate management (or any other group within the corporation) : 
power should be exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders . 1 66 The 
enforcement of the equitable limitation safely could be remitted to the judiciary, the 
common law of fiduciary duties being the only area of corporate law that had not 
undergone a steady weakening process because of charter competition. Not a single 
decided case denied the ultimate trusteeship of managers and controlling groups .  
"Flexible and realistic" judges, "if untrammeled by  statute," could be expected to  fmd 
solutions to problems that demanded a remedy _ l 67 
A point-by-point review of this program follows in the rest of this Section. The 
"public" characterization of corporate property comes first. The trust model is considered 
next. Finally comes Berle and Means' reliance on judicial enforcement of an open-ended 
standard. 
1. Cmporate Property as Public Property 
Berle and Means's assertion that corporate property should be placed on the public 
side of the line between public and private lives on in the appellation "public 
corporation." 1 68 But otherwise, it no longer has any apparent adherents because it asks 
for a more collectivized society than anyone in the corporate law community will 
concede in these antisocialist times. Eradication of Berle and Means ' s  public 
1 63 .  304 U.S.  64 ( 1 938) .  
1 64.  SERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 , at 2 1 9 .  Here, they reflect the thinking o f  their Columbia colleague, 
Robert Hale, who thought all private property amounted to was a delegation of publ ic  authority to excl ude 
others from its use. ROBERT L.  HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING 
POWER 366-79 ( 1 952). The public aspects of private property were, more genera11y, d i sc ussed in a variety o f  
regulatory and theoretical contexts at the time. For discussion, see FRIED, supra note 72,  at 6- 1 07, 1 69-75. 
1 65 .  S ERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 ,  at 2 1 9. 
! 66. !d. at 220. Further articulation applied the principle to the powers to issue new stock, to declare 
d ividends (majority to minority freeze-out fact pc>ttems), to repmchase stock, and to amend the charter. !d. at 
22 ! .  
1 67 .  !d. at 1 97, 295. 
! 62. Berle and Means used the more acc�1race term "quasi publ ic ."  !d. at 6 .  
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characterization has been one o f  contractarianism's points o f  paradigmatic success. 
Corporate property once more is private, and the presumption now lies against 
government intervention. 1 69 Even a limited, background characterization-corporations 
as private property with public implications-can be hard to sustain today. 
The separation of ownership and control nevertheless survives the contractarian 
rebuttal, reemerging as the primary source of agency costs. This in tum implies that Berle 
and Means's  fiduciary project never needed to characterize corporate property as public 
in the first place. It cuuld have proceeded on today ' s  assumption that the separation of 
ownership and control gives management opportunities to impair shareholder value and 
that correction can be welfare enhancing. There is an additional implication: while the 
public characterization does invite the imposition of trust duties, there is no particular 
reason to expect that performance of a trust for the benefit of a particular group of 
claimants, such as the shareholders, will satisfy the "public" interest in a world of 
multiple claims. If unconstrained corporate power creates urgent social problems, then 
stepped-up enforcement of traditional fiduciary duties holds out no serious prospect of a 
remedy. Indeed, a "public" coloration does not inevitably follow from the description of a 
separation of ownership and control. Regardless of the incentive and conflict of interest 
problems resulting from the separation, management and shareholders retain an 
overwhelming common "private" interest so far as concerns the competing interests of 
the rest of the world. Berle and Means elide this point, focusing exclusively on the 
modern corporation's failure to replicate the single responsible individual of the classical 
model. 
Berle and Means can easily be forgiven for their failure to confront this limitation on 
their remedial program. Since 1 932, problems of corporate social responsibility have 
consistently proven as hard to remedy as they are easy to diagnose.  To go beyond a 
fiduciary palliative and directly confront corporate social deficiencies is to reconsider the 
mechanisms of corporate governance from the ground up. Berle appears to have been of 
two minds on the matter. He is best remembered for the position he took i..'l a dialogue 
with E. Merrick Dodd published in 1 932 ,  the same year as the book. 1 70 There he stated 
what remains the majority view: anything other than unilateral management 
responsibility to the shareholder interest accords management excessive power and 
invites incoherent instructions. 1 7 1  In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, he 
struck off in the opposite direction, perhaps influenced by Means ' s  proj ections of ever­
increasing industrial concentration. The book ' s  position anticipates that of today 's  
constituency rights advocates: since the shareholders had given up responsibility for 
corporate property, other constituents should join Lhem as corporate beneficiaries .  
Corporations could be asked to serve the public with fair wages, job security, and good 
service to their customers; management must develop into a "purely neutral 
teclmocracy." 1 72 
Berle also can be forgiven this inconsistency. His indecision reflects the 
1 69 .  Bratton, supra note 1 30,  at 1 86-90. 
1 70.  Adolf A. Ber1e, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1 365 
( 1 932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,  45 HARV. L. REv. 1 1 45 ( 1 932) .  
1 7 1 .  Berle, supra note 1 70,  at 1 367-68. 
! 72.  BERLE & )'.1EANS, supra note 1 ,  at 7-8, 3 1 0- 1 2 . 
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ambivalence displayed in corporate law commentary ever since. 1 73 The public-regarding 
approach persists as a minority view. Each generation raises anew the same questions 
about corporate accountability because corporations continue to bear importantly on our 
social and political lives, and external regulation can never bring corporate results and 
perceived social goals into congmence . 1 74 At the same time, no advocate of enhanced 
responsibility has ever successfully confronted and disposed of the counterargument 
Berle made in the debate with Dodd. The Berle of the Berle-Dodd dialogue made no 
attempt to deny the gravity of the social responsibility problem. He merely argued that 
the managerialist solution on the table would make things worse. 
2. The Trust Model 
The iV!odern C01poration and Private Property presents a trust model of corporate 
:fiduciary duty as a conclusion drawn from case· law synthesis. 1 75 One nevertheless 
smpects that Berle knew perfectly well that corporate fiduciary law tends to eschew trust 
hnv precedent to follow the more relaxed fiduciary pattern o f  agency law. 1 76 The 
proposal of a stricter regime grounded in trust law, although not without resonances in 
case law, •.vas less a doctrinal result than a policy constmct designed to narrow (if not 
close) the governance breach opened by the separation of ownership and control .  
Tmst-based duties had two special j obs to perfom1 in the book. First (and famously), 
Berle and Means vvanted a strict duty of self abnegation to follow at the shareholder level 
upon acquisition of a control block of stock. Gain from transactions in control should be 
shared ·vvith the entire group of equityho1ders . l 77 Second, they wanted trust duties to 
effect anticontractarian results. Tl1e corporate law of a century before had included 
:rmmdatory restraints on corporate power. The corporate law of 1 93 2  permitted corporate 
insiders to write their own contracts . Management powers multiplied as a result. 
Irrrrnunity clames and waivers of shareholder rights went on to make the powers absolute. 
It folloYvtd that much diversion of corporate profit to managers ' pockets could be 
justified in contractual terms. 1 78 It would take a tmst regime to check the trend. Berle and 
Iv1eans had an absolute rule in n1ind: no language in a corporate charter could deny or 
defeat the fundamental equitable control of the court. TI1e principle was, they said, pmi: 
and parcel of the "object and nature of the corporation itself. " 1 79 
Berle and Means anticipated the issue debated by contractarians and 
H:rrticmriTacts.:rians a half-century later--whether corporate actors can opt out of fiducian; 
duties by means of a charter provision. ! 80 TI1e anticontractarians got the better of that 
discuss:� on, but, significantly, ihey did not reassert Berle and Means ' s  irust model. 
1 73 .  H:: icoked to evolution to make the positions consistent: At present management needed to be reined 
in; Uer it might prove up to the t;,s:, ofno:utral interest bal:mcing. Ber1e, supra note 1 70, at 1 369-70.  
1 74.  For a n  example from the newest generation, see generally Cynthia A Williams, The Securities and 
Exc!wnge Commission nnd Corporate Social Transparency, i 1 2  HA.RV. L. REv. 1 1 97 ( 1 999). 
1 75 .  BERLE & iViEANS, supra note I ,  ai l l 9-252. 
1 76.  For an ovJ:rvievv, see Bratton, sl!pra note 1 8 ,  at ! A-4-L!-6. 
l T7 .  B ede adulitted that the result had cn1y t::nta.liv.e support in the case 18.w. BER.LE & MEANS, supra note 
1 78. l�i. flt 1 2 8 , 220, 3 1 2 .  
l 79. id. at 2L!.2. 
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Instead, they validated mandatory corporate law on process grounds: open-ended opting 
out of fiduciary duties should not be permitted because collective action problems 
disabled effective bargaining on the shareholder side . 1 8 1  Thus, the separation of 
ownership and control remained at the fore of the case for shareholder protection in law 
even in the absence of a trust model. 
In fact, the trust model never really took an absolute hold on antimanagerialist 
academic writing in the decades after 1 932 .  Many who followed Berle and Means in 
arguing for a strong fiduciary posture for corporate law drew on the concept of 
"shareholder expectations" rather than on trust. This also originated in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. It shows up when Berle and Means express doubts 
about a trust model: 
The difficulty is less with theory than with application. It would require an 
expert and courageous court to apply this theory to most of the corporate 
problems reaching litigation. For this reason, it cannot be reckoned on as a 
solution of the major difficulties in the problem. It does indicate, however, that 
the common law has at its command tools adequate to meet the situation in 
sufficiently competent hands. The indefmiteness of its application, and the 
extreme expense and difficulty of litigation, still leave the stockholder virtually 
helpless. In fact, if not Ll1 law, at the moment we are thrown back on the 
obvious conclusion that a stockholder's  right lies in the expectation of fair 
dealing rather than in the ability to enforce a series of supposed legal clairns . 1 82 
Although the passage is not a model of clarity, the point seems to have been that the trust 
model probably would not lead to a reliable real world enforcement program, leaving the 
shareholders with something less-mere "expectations" of fair dealing. That lesser 
concept went on to serve for decades as a primary justification for fiduciary duties in 
corporate legal theory. 
Under expectations theory, as articulated by the successor commentators, the rule 
against management self-dealing reflects the "expectations" of shareholder 
beneficiaries. 1 83 Trust is not absent: the shareholders expect management solicitude as an 
aspect of their �crusting investments. But, iwnically, the fiduciary mandate becomes 
attached to the expectation rather than the trust because of the separation of ownership 
and control. With the public corporation, shareholders and managers do not collaborate 
directly i.i1 the manner of traditional trustees and beneficiaries .  The shareholders, 
moreover, have the self-protective device of exit through a market sale. This attenuates 
the fiduciary law ' s  behavioral framework of loyalty, weighing against a trust model. 
Given public trading, "expectations" resonate better. But the Ber1e and Means paradigm 
still bears critically-it fills in the background picture of operative expectations. 
Management' s  position as an essential catalyst of mass production empowers it as agail1St 
the shareholders who rely on management capability, probity, and cormnitment to the 
1 8 1 .  Jd. 
1 82.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 ,  at 242-43. 
1 83. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-lnt::rested Tm;1sactions in Corporaie Law, 13 J .  CORP. L. 997, 998-99 
( 1 988); David ivlorris Phil l ips, /Yfanagerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corpora!? 
Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. P.EV. 1 84, 2 i 9-20 ( 1 979). 
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Even as expectations theory relied on Berle and Means for content, it held out a 
possibility of rej ection of their prescriptive program. It admitted a retelling of the story of 
management power and shareholder dependence in contractual terms. The shareholders ' 
very dependence on management leads them "reasonably to expect" management self­
abnegation. Their investment could not make business sense on any other basis. 
Reference to contract also helps explain corporate fiduciary law ' s  allowance of fully 
disclosed and fairly priced self-dealing transactions. Full disclosure moves the parties 
toward an arm's-length posture, and fair price tends, as a practical matter, to mean 
comparison with comparable arm's-length transactions. 1 85  This implies a contractual 
norm that tolerates self-dealing so long as freely situated parties would do the same deal. 
On this reading of shareholder expectations, articulation of the content of fiduciary duties 
becomes a corporate playing out of the contractual search for the intention of the parties. 
Expectations theory posited congruence between fiduciary responsibility, economic 
welfare, and the contractual aspects of corporate relationships .  As noted above, that 
equilibrium depended on a descriptive grounding in the Berle and M eans picture of 
corporate relationships. A change in the prevailing description of shareholder 
expectations could disrupt it, leaving legal theory without a strong basis of support for 
corporate law's fiduciary regime. The contractarian paradigm effected just that change.  It 
brought the mandatory fiduciary rule into question by reversing B erle and M eans ' s  
presumption favoring regulation. It also replaced expectation theory ' s  reliant shareholder 
with a rational economic actor expecting the worst and ready to self-protect. The 
assertion that control by itself should give rise to strong fiduciary duties came in for 
particularly sharp criticism: a gain-sharing rule attending control transactions would chill 
deals and thereby prevent corporate assets from going to higher valuing users . l 86  In the 
long run, this would disserve even minority shareholders . l 87 
Corporate fiduciary law has survived the contractarian assault. The incentive 
justification articulated by Berle and Means for the basic rule against self-dealing still 
holds. A control party, they noted, has every incentive to maximize its own retums at the 
firm' s  expense. A sixty percent shareholder who sells worthless property to the firm for 
one million dollars loses only a proportional six hundred thousand dollars on the deal and 
so comes out four hundred thousand dollars ahead at the minority's  expense . l 88  On the 
other hand, equal sharing of gains never became the rule respecting transfers of control .  
The two famous cases that move in that direction, Perlman v. Feldmann l 89 and Jones v. 
H. F. Ahmanson & Co. ,  1 90 sit quietly by themselves in the reporters. Their invitations to a 
generalized gain-sharing constraint have not been accepted. They seem to be good law, 
however, in their narrow spheres, constraining parties in sale of control transactions . 
1 84 .  Bratton, supra note 1 4 1 ,  at 4 1 3 - 1 4 . 
1 85 .  Eisenberg, supra note 1 83, at 998-99. 
1 86 .  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7,  at 1 1 7 -24.  
1 87 .  !d. at  I 09-44. 
1 88 .  BERLE & MEANS, supra note I ,  at 1 1 4. For a contemporary restatement, see Lucian A rye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 1 05 HARV. L.  
REV. 1 435,  1 462-63 ( 1 992). 
1 89.  2 1 9  F.2d 1 73 (2d Cir. 1 955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 ( 1 955). 
1 90.  460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1 969). 
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More importantly, gain-sharing concerns now pervade the law of mergers and 
acquisitions. They motivate Delaware law ' s  procedural rules respecting the 
accomplishment of cash-out mergers between parents and majority-held subsidiaries 1 9 1  
and Delaware's  fiduciary constraints on defenses against hostile takeovers . 1 92 
Meanwhile, even as the presumption in corporate legal theory lies against new regulation, 
the inherited fiduciary regime enjoys a steadily expanding base of support from economic 
theory . l 93 It also enjoys strengthening empirical support from comparative studies of 
corporate governance regimes world wide . These studies show a direct correlation 
between fiduciary protection, shareholder value, and the depth of trading markets. 1 94 
3. Judicial Enforcement 
Berle and Means ' s  trust model differs from Douglas ' s  Chapter X in following legal 
realism' s  private law side in its view of the common law judge. The trust model 
presupposes that judges can master complex business fact patterns and then successfully 
apply a fairness rule or standard. But the book also expresses serious doubts. As the 
passage quoted above shows, I 9S it questioned whether most judges had talent or courage 
needed for the realist role of judge as regulator; even if the judges had the right stuff, it 
was not clear that plaintiffs would have incentives to prosecute the necessary lawsuits. 
Berle and Means hedged their predictions accordingly. The hedge extended even to 
judicial constraint of corporate control transactions, so central to the program: control 
transfers would most likely remain outside the "normal cognizance" of corporate law. 1 96 
Despite the doubts, Berle and Means remitted the problem of separation of 
ownership and control to a "flexible and realistic" judiciary. They thereby tied their 
paradigm's  plausibility to the level confidence in judicial enforcement. Confidence 
waned even as the paradigm held sway. This is seen in the work of two of its later 
exponents, Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein. In a series of articles making strong, 
practical cases for gain sharing, Brudney and Chirelstein dispensed with the Berle and 
Means ' s  open-ended standards. Echoing the Douglas of Chapter X, they substituted per 
se rules, directives that flatly prohibited certain suspect practices, tying the case for 
1 9 1 .  See, e.g. , Weinberger v .  UOP, Inc. ,  457 A.2d 701  (Del. 1 983) (requiring a negotiating committee on 
behalf of minority shareholders). 
1 92.  See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc . ,  5 7 1  A.2d 1 1 40 (Del .  1 989) (explaining that under 
Delaware law, before the business judgment rule is appl ied to a board 's adoption of a defensive measure, the 
burden wil l  l ie with the board to prove reasonable grounds for its belief that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness exists, and that any defensive measure adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat posed by the 
attempted takeover); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc . ,  506 A.2d 1 73 (Del. 1 986) 
(requiring auctions to maximize value in some situations); Unocal Corp. v .  Mesa Petroleum Co . ,  493 A.2d 946 
(De l .  1 985) (constraining management's d iscretion to discourage takeovers). 
1 93. See, e.g. , Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder 
Wealth, 1 5  J .L .  ECON. & ORG. 487 ( 1 999) (validating the legal prohibition against self-dealing); Tal ley, supra 
note 1 8  (supporting the corporate opportunity doctrine). 
1 94. See, e.g. , La Porta et al . ,  supra note 1 6 1  (analyzing the results of a comparative study of the world's 
twenty largest publ icly traded firms against the Berle and Means thesis); Raphael La Porta et a! . ,  Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1 1 3 1  ( 1 997) (examining the ability of companies in forty-nine 
countries to raise internal financing). 
1 95. See supra note 1 82 and accompanying text. 
1 96.  BERLE & M EANS, supra note I ,  at 2 1 8 . 
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extending the fairness regime to a call for a diminished zone of judicial discretion. 1 97 
Brudney and Chirelstein ' s  suggestions did not, for the most part, fmd their way into 
the case law1 98 any more than did Berle 's .  But the cumulated pressure of these and other 
commentators did prompt some changes . Quite a few control transactions came under 
legal cognizance in the post-war period. But the trend favors process scrutiny. Reference 
is made again to Delaware 's cases on cash-out mergers . 1 99 These deal with a one-sided 
control transaction by encouraging the dominant party to participate in a constructed 
bargaining process. A specially designated fiduciary is inserted to bargain on behalf o f  
the formerly powerless minority shareholders. The judge then reviews the process, 
including the resulting bargain. If the process passes, the transaction itself avoids 
substantive fairness scrutiny under an open-ended standard. 200 
The move to a fiduciary regime built on bargaining under constraint parallels the 
development of the law of corporate reorganization in the transition from Chapter X to 
the Bankruptcy Code. In both contexts, ( 1 )  plausible, if imperfect, contractual solutions 
are favored over direct judicial application of a fairness standard; (2) judicial review 
remains integral to the system, but proceeds in the less highly charged and less 
technically demanding framework of process review; and (3) fairness  scrutiny plays a 
shadowy role, looming in the background as a threat to encourage the parties to keep the 
constructed bargaining process reasonably clean. The shift to process scrutiny serves the 
same institutional purpose in both contexts: the judge no longer has to determine the fair 
value of the company in reliance on valuation evidence proffered (and manipulated) by 
expert witnesses. Both Chapter X and the trust model fell short at this point in the 
scenario. Corporate value depends on projections about uncertain future events, events 
that unfold in a dynamic environment. Of course,  such proj ections of value must be 
grounded in historical results, even in volatile securities markets.20 l Therefore, judicial 
valuation through fact fmding is at least plausible. The problem comes at the bottom line. 
There financial science fails to yield a single, ascexiainable true or intrinsic value figure, 
only a range of possibilities. Selection of a figure in the range follows from intuitions.  
Such an intuitive result carries greater legitimacy when derived in a bargaining process 
than when derived in a litigation process. 
A fairness regime could be constructed so as to ameliorate valuation ' s  
indeterminacy. A system could, for example, make a normative commitment t o  the 
welfare of the disadvantaged party and instruct the judge to choose a value from the end 
of the range aligned with that party's  interests. But just as the 1 97 8  bankruptcy reform 
1 97.  See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.  
I 354 ( 1 978) (suggesting that all going-private transactions be prohibited); Victor Brudney & Marvin A .  
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in  Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HA..'�V. L.  REv. 297 ( 1 974) (suggesting that 
gains resulting from mergers of subsidiaries into parent corporations be divided equally be tween the parent and 
the subsidiarJ by a percentage of premerger values). 
1 98 .  The exception is Mil ls  v.  Electric Auto-Lite Co. , 552 F.2d 1 239, 1 248 (7th Cir. 1 977), cert. denied, 
"! 34 U.S.  922 ( 1 977)  (drawing on Brudney and Chirelstein 's work in l i tigation respecting a merger) . 
1 99. See, e.g. , Weinberger v. UOP, Inc . ,  457 A.2d 701 (Del .  1 983) ;  Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chern. CoJTl. 
493 A .2d 1 099 (Del . 1 985);  Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys.,  Inc . 669 A.2d 79 (De l .  1 985).  
200. See Weinberger, 457 A .2d at 703 (originating the procedural sequence). 
20 1 .  The prices of dot com stocks provide a recent case of an exception. But as the statement in the text 
would predict, such exceptions tend to be short-lived and dot com prices did indeed coliapse during the l atter 
part of 2000 .  
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lacked a strong nonnative commitment to the bondholder interest, so  corporate law has 
remained unwilling either to elevate the interest of the minority shareholder or even to 
mandate value maximization for the shareholders as a group. At this normative level, 
Delaware law plays the leading role. Indeed, Brudney and Chirelstein's disenchantment 
with judicial discretion may have reflected dissatisfaction with the D elaware courts ' 
nonnative performance. 
The Delaware courts shut the trust model out of decided cases throughout the period 
of Berle and Means 's paradigmatic ascendancy. They responded to a market demand in 
so doing. Large corporations tend to choose Delaware incorporation and Delaware 
judicial responsiveness to management concerns figures importantly in those choices.202 
The Delaware courts demonstrated that responsiveness by refusing to open themselves to 
Berle and Means' s  influence, thereby foreclosing the possibility of a theory to practice 
transition for Berle and Means ' s  prescriptive program. 
Significantly, The Modern Corporation and Private Property mentions its future 
judicial nemesis only once. The book acknowledges Delaware as "the loosest of 
jurisdictions" even as it credits the Delaware judiciary with adherence to equitable 
principles,203 citing a dictum in a 1 928  Chancery opinion204 endorsing the vested rights 
theory of preferred stockholder protection. The book's characterization quickly proved 
inaccurate. Eight years after the book' s  publication, in the landmark case Federal United 
Corp. v. Havender, 205 the Delaware court rejected vested rights protection for preferred 
stockholders. Havender also took a giant step toward containing judicial discretion to 
police transactions for unfaimess by inventing Delaware' s  doctrine of independent legal 
significance. Under this doctrine, the courts apply the state ' s  corporate code literally, like 
a collection of legal forms in an office file drawer, and refrain from drawing policy 
inferences that might constrain corporate actors' transactional discretion. Havender 
amounts to a judicial review of Berle and Means ' s  book. The book singles out the courts 
and their equitable discretion as a bulwark against laxity in the drafting of corporate 
codes and charters . Havender falsified the book' s  description as it narrowed the field for 
equitable intervention. 
Berle failed to appreciate charter competition' s  institutional implications and to 
predict the leading role of the Delaware court. The miss presents a bit of a puzzle, 
because Berle was well aware of Delaware 's  success as a charter-mongerer. His casebook 
includes an empirical study (conducted by Means) of the states of incorporation of New 
York Stock Exchange companies. The study shows a clear trend in Delaware ' s  favor, 
with a fifty-five percent share of charters since 1 922.206 Berle had also served, from 1928 
to 1 929, on a committee organized by T'ne Corporation Trust Company to recommend 
changes in Delaware 's  corporate code. There, Berle got a firsthand look at Delaware 's  
corporate legislative process .  Changes approved by the committee and sent on to  the 
Delaware Bar Association were rubber- stamped. But Berle ' s  recommendations of 
202. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERJCAN CORPORATE LAW 32-40 ( 1 993). 
203. B ERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 ,  at 237. Tney assert confidently that Delaware adheres to vested rights 
protection of preferred stock..'10lders. Yet, Delaware was to abandon that position only a few years later. 
204. Davis v .  Louisville Gas & Elec. Co . ,  1 42 A.  654, 656-68 (Del .  Ch. 1 928) .  
205. 1 1  A.2cl 3 3 1 ,  337 (Del .  1 940). 
206. SERLE, supra note 97, at 1 22-25 . 
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provisions to protect small shareholders never got out of comrnittee.207 Soon thereafter 
his book would describe all corporate law judges, in Delaware and elsewhere, as wielders 
of equitable principles from positions of independence, impervious to competitive 
pressure.208 He saw Delaware and charter competition as implicating laxity in corporate 
legislation, but not in corporate judging. The judicially enforced trust model, he hoped, 
would simultaneously ameliorate the competition problem and the problem of the 
separation of ownership and control. 
He hoped in vain. But Berle can be forgiven for this one last shortcoming. The 
solution to the puzzle lies in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,209 decided in 1 938 .  Prior to 
Erie a corporate law plaintiff who could establish diversity got to choose between not 
only state and federal venues but state and federal common law. The case law synthesis 
in The Modern Corporation and Private Property includes federal common law cases as 
well as state cases, without noting any distinction between the two.21 0 Given an 
independent, competing federal common law judiciary, Berle's assumptions about the 
judicial role are not unreasonable_2l l  Delaware could take the charters and legislate the 
code, but many plaintiffs could circumvent its courts and case law by going into federal 
court under federal common law. For Berle, then, the key point was to make sure that that 
common law fiduciary duties remained mandatory. Erie frustrated the plan by according 
the Delaware judiciary an authoritative voice. 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property came to need a pocket part 
responding to the appearance of the authoritative (and hostile) Delaware judiciary. Berle 
never wrote the sequel. Appropriately enough, when a sequel did appear, it came from a 
member of the Columbia law faculty. This occurred in 1 974 in the form of William L.  
207 .  SCHWARZ, supra note 1 0, a t  55 .  
208. Cf B ERLE & M EANS, supra note I ,  a t  1 97 (noting that fiduciary duty was the only area of corporate 
Jaw that had not weakened and commending judicial intervention "untrammeled by statute"). 
209. 304 U.S.  64 (I 938) .  
2 I 0. See Handley v.  Stutz, 1 39 U.S .  4 1 7  ( 1 89 1  ) ;  Barclay v .  Wabash Ry.  Co., 30 F 2d 260 (2d Cir.  1 929);  
Atlantic Ref. Co.  v. Hodgman, 1 3  F .2d 781 (3d Cir. 1 926);  Jones v .  Missouri-Edison Elec.  Co. ,  1 44 F.  765 (8th 
Cir. I 906); Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533 (D. R.I. 1 929); Barnes v .  Andrews, 298 F. 
6 1 4  (S. D.N.Y. 1 924); Brown v.  Pa. Canal Co., 229 F .  444 (E.D. Pa. 1 9 1 6); cf Strong v. Repide, 2 1 3  U.S .  4 1 9  
( 1 909) (deciding dispute respecting corporation doing business i n  the Phil ippines). Al l  o f  these cases fol low the 
same practice respecting case Jaw authority. Reference is made indiscriminately to other federal corporate law 
decisions and to  state court decisions, principally from New York and New Jersey. No special  recognition i s  
accorded the case law of the state of incorporation. 
2 1 1 .  However, federal courts in corporate cases where jurisdiction was based on divers i ty did not i gnore 
the chartering state and its J aw completely. The internal affairs doctrine also came to bear with the result that a 
federal court in diversity not located in the chartering state might decline to take j urisdiction and remit the 
parties to courts in the state of incorporation. But where assets and parties had only nominal contacts with the 
chartering state, it was deemed expedient to take jurisdiction provided the rel ief requested did not implicate 
"visitorial" powers. Once jurisdiction was obtained, the case was decided as a matter of federal equity .  
Wil l iamson v .  Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co . ,  56 F .2d 503 ,  507- 1 0  (7th Cir. 1 932) (taking jurisdiction over a 
Delaware corporation the assets and parties of which resided in J l l inois). See also Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. 
of N .Y . ,  288 U.S. 1 23 ( 1 933) (holding that a federal court should decline jurisdiction over a shareholder suit 
implicating internal affairs where convenience efficiency and justice pointed to the courts of the chartering 
state). State courts reasoned analogously, despite the internal affairs doctrine. See JOSEPH HENRY B EALE, J R . ,  
BEALE O N  FOREIGN CORPORATIONS § §  305 ,  3 1 2  ( 1 904) (noting that in the case of a "quasi public corporation" 
with nominal contacts with its chartering state, the courts of the shareholders' state wi l l  take equitable 
jurisdiction to prevent theft). 
2001] Berle and Means Reconsidered 769 
Cary' s  Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, the famous 
indictment of Delaware law.2 1 2 Cary reviewed leading Delaware opinions and concluded 
that Delaware had "no public policy left . . .  except the obj ective of raising revenue. "2 1 3 
A reference to Berle and Means helps make Cary' s  anger understandable. They had 
shown the high road and Delaware had chosen not to take it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Berle and Means 's trust model never came to be adopted in either corporate law or 
corporate legal theory. But the part succeeded where the whole did not: shareholder value 
maximization is more embedded than ever as the field's  governing norm, and Berle and 
Means are its leading historical exponents. Of course, the shareholder value norm 
succeeds today at a self-regulatory level to some extent, confrrming the judgment Berle 
reached as a Wall Street lawyer prior to becoming the Berle of law and economics.  But 
the degree and persistence of self-regulatory success remains unclear. Therefore, Berle 
and Means and the separation of ownership and control remain relevant and fiduciary 
standards remain a primary concern in corporate governance. 
Berle and Means have played a secondary, but still  critical role in the shaping of 
corporate fiduciary law. There the trust model has been the thesis deployed against the 
antithesis of contractarianism, first as wielded by early twentieth century lawyers and 
later as wielded by late century lawyer economists. Although neither the thesis nor the 
antithesis has prevailed in theory or in law, each has highlighted the weaknesses in the 
other and influenced the emergent synthesis. The synthesis is process scrutiny under the 
fiduciary rubric. It bespeaks a consensus that Berle and Means (and Douglas) were right 
to reject free contract as an institution suited to security-holders with collective action 
problems, but wrong to assume strict legal scrutiny in the trustee-beneficiary mode to be 
the only viable remedy. The synthesis evolves by trial and error. Crucial contributions 
have come from variant sources-the drafters of the 1 978 bankruptcy reform, the 
Delaware judiciary, the institutional investor activists, and the academics who worked out 
the real world implications of the microeconomics of corporate governance .  Where 
contract proves p lausible, it deflects full dress fiduciary treatment. But contract is not 
always plausible . So the trust reproach remains essential to the evolutionary dynamic and 
Berle and Means ' s  book remains its essential text. 
Berle and Means also have a place in the global venue. Fiduciary standards have 
become a concern in other corporate governance systems. In Europe, for example, 
protection of the rights of minority shareholders sits atop the agendas o f  today's 
corporate law reformers . They seek to expand the depth of their domestic trading markets 
and reason, along with Berle and Means, that robust markets depend on legal 
infrastructures that constrain insider self-dealing.2 1 4 Eerie ' s  back-and-fort.h on corporate 
2 1 2 . Will iam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 
( 1 974). 
2 1 3 . !d. at 684; see also Marvin A .  Chire1ste in,  Towards a Federal Fiduciary Standards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. 
L REv. 203 ( 1 98 1 ). 
2 1 4 .  Wi l l iam W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of 
the Firm: nze Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J .  TRANSNAT ' L  L .  2 1 3, 2 68-7 1 ( 1 999); see 
also John C. Coffee, Jr . ,  The Future as Histoty: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
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social responsibility also echoes in the global conversation. The usual argwnent made by 
those who side with the Berle of the Berle-Dodd debate is that social demands should be 
met by extemal regulation or wealth redistribution through taxation and transfer 
payments. The argument has had its effect, providing the defmitive response to proposals 
for corporate governance reform that look to enhanced social responsibility. But it rings 
hollow in the global venue, which lacks a plausible sovereign regulator. Corporations 
take advantage of this open territory, using various means of regulatory arbitrage to 
escape domestic regulation and avoid paying taxes.2 1 5  The corporate responsibility 
question becomes more serious as the arbitrage succeeds. We could yet see the global 
conversation lurch to the Berle of Berle and Means and renew the demand for a "neutral 
technocracy." 
Govemance and lis Jmplicaiions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 6"� I ( 1 999) (arguing that securities and fiduciary law 
matters in  a global competitive success). 
2 1 5. Se.e genera/!y Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and ihe Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welj�1re Stare, 1 1 3 l-IARV. L. REV. 1 575 (2000) (describing regulatory 8.rbitrage in the global context). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ch.:ristine Litaker was an African-American administrative assistant vvorking for 
Leluuan Brothers, one of the major brokerage houses in the United States. 1 Because of 
her gender and race, her boss regularly called her a "black bitch,"2 and other employees 
1 .  Litaker v .  Lehman Bro s .  Holdings, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1 607 (DC), 1 999 U . S .  Dist.  LEXIS n58 1 
(S .D.N.Y.  Aug. 1 3 ,  1 999) .  
2. Jd. at ''4. 
